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THE PAROL EVIDENCE RULE AND IMPLIED
TERMS: THE SOUNDS OF SILENCE
HELEN HADJIYANNAKTS*
INTRODUCTION
W e N a client asks his lawyer what his duties are under a particular
ritten contract, the lawyer's first words of response are usually:
"Show me the contract." Yet a party's contractual obligations cannot be
determined solely from a literal reading of a contractual document. The
obvious first step is to interpret the document's language in light of all
relevant circumstances, including any prior dealings between the parties
and usages of the trade. Assuming that interpretation reveals no provi-
sion in the writing covering a particular issue, should the lawyer advise
the client that he has no obligations other than those listed in the con-
tract? Definitely not.
A seller of goods, for example, may have made no express warranties,
yet be liable for breach of implied warranties arising from the circum-
stances of the sale.' Furthermore, an obligation of good faith and fair
dealing, which exists in all contracts,2 requires in some cases only ab-
sence of interference in the other party's performance3, but in others,
affirmative conduct to cooperate in enhancing the other party's profits
* Associate Professor, Fordham University School of Law; B.A. 1969, Vassar Col-
lege; J.D. 1978, Fordham University School of Law. The author wishes to thank the
Fordham law students who provided research assistance for this Article: Michael
Getzler, Owen Kalt, Steven Feinman, Sara Culp and John Caulfield.
1. See infra note 184.
2. U.C.C. § 1-203 (1978); Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 205 comment d
(1979) [hereinafter cited as Second Restatement]; see Burton, More on Good Faith Per-
formance of a Contract" A Reply to Professor Summers, 69 Iowa L Rev. 497, 498-501
(1984) [hereinafter cited as More on Good Faith]; Burton, Good Faith Performance of a
Contract within Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 67 Iowa L. Rev. 1, 4-6 (1981);
Farnsworth, Good Faith Performance and Commercial Reasonableness under the Uni-
form Commercial Code, 30 U. Chi. L. Rev. 666, 666-79 (1963); Summers, The General
Duty of Good Faith-Its Recognition and Conceptualization, 67 Cornell L. Rev. 810, 830-
31 (1982); Summers, "Good Faith" in General Contract Law and the Sales Provisions of
the Uniform Commercial Code, 54 Va. L. Rev. 195, 207-08 (1968) [hereinafter cited as
Good Faith]. For a list of cases representing jurisdictions that have explicitly recognized
as a common law proposition that such a duty exists in every contract, see Burton,
Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty to Perform in God Faith, 94 Harv. L.
Rev. 369, 404 app. (1980).
3. See, ag., Concrete Specialties v. I-.C. Smith Constr. Co., 423 F.2d 670, 672 (10th
Cir. 1970) (duty of cooperation); Ligon v. Parr, 471 S.W.2d 1, 3 (Ky. 1971) (same);
Mortgage Corp. v. Manhattan Say. Bank, 71 NJ. Super. 489, 502, 177 A.2d 326, 334
(1962) ("Though a court balks at making a contract for the parties, it will, where justice
and expediency demand, infuse the contract with a spirit of good faith and fair dealing in
order to justify the implication of a covenant which will prevent one party from impairing
the right of the other party to receive the fruits of the contract.') (quoting Price v.
Spielman Motor Sales Co., 261 App. Div. 626, 629, 26 N.Y.S. 2d 836, 839 (1941)) (quot-
ing 25 Cornell L.Q. 615, 615-16 (1940)).
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under the contract.4 Assuming that the parties intend a contract, terms
absent from the agreement of the parties' but necessary for the resolution
of the parties' contractual rights and obligations may be supplied by the
court.' The purpose of this Article7 is to explore the relationship be-
tween the implication of terms, sometimes called "the process of implica-
tion,"8 and the parol evidence rule. Although each topic has been the
subject of considerable scholarly examination,9 the relationship between
the two has received scant attention. 10
The parol evidence rule states that if the parties assent to a writing as
the final and complete expression of the terms of their agreement, evi-
dence of prior or contemporaneous agreements may not be admitted to
contradict, vary, or add to the terms of the writing. 1 Although the
4. See Havel v. Kelsey-Hayes Co., 83 A.D.2d 380, 383, 445 N.Y.S.2d 333, 335
(1981) (implied covenant of good faith requires that exclusive licensee exploit license);
Kubick v. J. & R. Foods, Inc., 282 Or. 179, 183, 577 P.2d 518, 520 (1978) (good faith
under U.C.C. § 2-306(2) requires use of "best efforts to supply or promote the product");
see also generally Good Faith, supra note 2.
5. A phenomenon recognized by the sales article of the Uniform Commercial Code
(UCC or Code) is that generally parties consciously bargain over only a few important
terms of a contract for the sale of goods: quantity, description and price. Hawkland,
Sales Contract Terms under the UC.C., 17 U.C.C. L.J. 195, 196 (1985).
6. U.C.C. § 2-204(3) & official comment (1978); Second Restatement, supra note 2,
§ 204; Hawkland, supra note 5, at 196-97; see, eg., U.C.C. § 2-305(1) (1978) ("reasonable
price at the time for delivery"); id. § 2-308(a) (delivery at "seller's place of business"); Id.
§ 2-309(1) (delivery within "a reasonable time"). Acceptance of this principle by the
Second Restatement can be attributed to Professor Farnsworth's influential article,
Farnsworth, Disputes over Omission in Contracts, 68 Colum. L. Rev. 860 (1968). See 47
A.L.I. Proc. 473, 480-82 (1970) (remarks of Professor Robert Braucher) [hereinafter
cited as 1970 ALI Proceedings]. For a recent discussion of the Second Restatement ap-
proach, see Speidel, Restatement Second: Omitted Terms and Contract Method, 67 Cor-
nell L. Rev. 785, 792-809 (1982).
7. The parol evidence rule has few, if any, supporters among academic commenta-
tors. Corbin wished that the rule had "[n]ever been stated." 3 A. Corbin, Corbin on
Contracts § 582, at 455 (1960). Professor Sweet urges a major overhaul. See Sweet, Con-
tract Making and Parol Evidence: Diagnosis and Treatment of a Sick Rule, 53 Cornell L.
Rev. 1036, 1062-63 (1968). Others have urged its abolition. See Note, The Parol Evi-
dence Rule: Is It Necessary?, 44 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 972, 985-87 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Is
It Necessary?]. This Article does not seek to add yet another voice to the throng of
critics.
8. See 3 A. Corbin, supra note 7, § 562, at 286.
9. For commentary on the process of implication, see id. §§ 561-572A; 4
S. Williston, A Treatise on the Law of Contracts § 610B, at 532-53 (3d ed. 1961); Farns-
worth, supra note 6, at 876-81. For a list of commentary on the parol evidence rule, see 9
J. Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law § 2401, at 7-8 n.1 (Chadbourn rev. ed.
1981). For a listing of commentary on the UCC parol evidence rule, see infra note 78.
10. Some aspects of the issue have been addressed by Professor Farnsworth in Farns-
worth, supra note 6, at 887-90 and by the Second Restatement, supra note 2, § 204 com-
ment e & ill. 1.
11. For various formulations of the parol evidence rule, see U.C.C. § 2-202 (1978); 3
A. Corbin, supra note 7, § 573, at 357; 4 S. Williston, supra note 9, § 631, at 948-51.
The statement in the text referring to contemporaneous agreements requires some ex-
planation and qualification. A contemporaneous written agreement is generally deemed
part of the final writing and is therefore operative. See Brown v. Financial Serv. Corp.,
489 F.2d 144, 149 (5th Cir. 1974); Restatement of Contracts § 237 comment a (1932)
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courts traditionally assumed such assent from the mere fact that an ap-
parently complete writing was entered into,12 the Uniform Commercial
Code and the Second Restatement of Contracts (Second Restatement) no
longer make that assumption. 3 The increased willingness of courts to
supply terms to fill gaps in parties' agreements and the liberalization of
the parol evidence rule mean that one who enters into an apparently
complete written contract has no assurance that his only obligations are
those expressed in the writing. A court might "imply" a term, or permit
the other party to prove a term agreed to during negotiations but not
included in the final written agreement. This Article explores the dy-
namic between the two possibilities.
Part I of this Article considers whether a rule of law that applies to the
agreement as written is protected by the parol evidence rule. This issue
arises when a party seeks to introduce proof of an oral agreement displac-
ing a rule of law that would apply to the agreement as written. Parts II
through V pose the opposite question: Does the parol evidence rule ex-
clude a term implied by law? Whereas the issue addressed in Part I as-
sumes that the court has already decided that a legal obligation exists,
Parts II through V do not. Part II considers whether the parol evidence
rule applies to obligations imposed by law. In other words, does the fact
that the parties have entered into a written agreement affect the court's
ability (or willingness) to supply a term? Parts M through V consider
whether the parol evidence rule bars proof of the negotiations of the par-
[hereinafter cited as First Restatement]; 4 S. Williston, supra note 9, § 628, at 913-14. As
to contemporaneous oral agreements the prevailing view is that their proof is subject to
exclusion by the parol evidence rule. See U.C.C. § 2-202 (1978); First Restatement,
supra, § 237; 4 S. Williston, supra note 9, § 637, at 1036. Corbin disagrees presumably
because the substantive basis of the parol evidence rule, intention to supersede and dis-
charge a prior agreement, is inapplicable to simultaneous agreements. See 3 A. Corbin,
supra note 7, § 577, at 400-01. His reasoning appears to be as follows: If"contemporane-
ous" means "simultaneous," two results follow. First, the existence of a consistent oral
agreement is relevant to show the writing is incomplete. Id. at 401. If the oral agreement
exists, the writing must necessarily be incomplete because "[o]ne cannot express simulta-
neous assent to two things and at the same instant agree that one of them supplants and
nullifies the other." Id. Second, by the same reasoning, the existence of a contradictory
oral agreement is relevant to show that a writing was not assented to as final. See id.
§ 583, at 469-70, § 573, at 203-04 n.1 (1971 Supp.). If "contemporaneous" does not
mean "simultaneous," the oral agreement is either prior or subsequent to the writing. See
id. § 577, at 401. The parol evidence rule does not apply to subsequent agreements. Id.;
J. Calamari & J. Perillo, The Law of Contracts § 3-6, at 113-14 (2d ed. 1977).
The Second Restatement position appears to be that the parol evidence rule does apply
to contemporaneous agreements. See Second Restatement, supra note 2, § 215 (eviden-
tiary effect is to exclude "evidence of prior or contemporaneous" agreements). But see id.
§ 213(1), (2) (substantive effect is to discharge only prior agreements). The Reporter
declined to follow Corbin's view because terms can be "relatively contemporaneous." See
48 A.L.I. Proc. 441, 449 (1971) (remarks of Professor Braucher) [hereinafter cited as
1971 ALI Proceedings].
12. See 4 S. Williston, supra note 9, § 633, at 1014-15. See infra note 46 and accom-
panying text.
13. See infra notes 78-79, 93, 95 and accompanying text.
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ties to establish a legal obligation (Part III), to give definition to a legal
obligation (Part IV) or to negate a legal obligation (Part V).
The inquiry into the relationship between the parol evidence rule and
implied terms is complicated by the lack of uniformity of scholarly and
judicial opinion as to the scope of the rule.14 This lack of uniformity in
turn reflects divergent opinions on the theoretical bases of the rule.'
Although most authorities agree that the parol evidence rule is not a rule
of evidence,16 there is no agreement as to whether it is a rule of substan-
tive law based on the intention of the parties,17 a rule of form which
operates to limit freedom of contract,' 8 a rule of estoppel," a rule of
procedure20 or a rule of judicial convenience.21
A second complication arises because this inquiry requires careful
identification of the basis on which the particular obligation is implied.
An obligation may be implied as an inference of the intention of the par-
ties, i.e., implied in fact, or as a duty imposed by law to fill a gap in the
parties' agreement, i.e., implied in law.22 The courts, though, are seldom
14. See Broude, The Consumer and the Parol Evidence Rule: Section 2-202 of the
Uniform Commercial Code, 1970 Duke L.J. 881, 884; Palmer, Reformation and the Parol
Evidence Rule, 65 Mich. L. Rev. 833, 834-36 (1967).
15. See generally Calamari and Perillo, A Plea for a Uniform Parol Evidence Rule and
Principles of Contract Interpretation, 42 Ind. L.J. 333 (1967); Sweet, supra note 7.
16. See Rinaudo v. Bloom, 209 Md. 1, 5-6, 120 A.2d 184, 187-88 (1956); 3 A. Corbin,
supra note 7, § 573, at 357-58; First Restatement, supra note 11, § 237 comment a; Sec-
ond Restatement, supra note 2, § 213 comment a; 9 J. Wigmore, supra note 9, § 2400, at
4; 4 S. Williston, supra note 9, § 631, at 955. Wigmore has stated of the parol evidence
rule:
It does not exclude certain data because they are for one or another reason
untrustworthy or undesirable means of evidencing some fact to be proved ....
What the rule does is to declare that certain kinds of fact are legally ineffective
in the substantive law; and this of course (like any other ruling of substantive
law) results in forbidding the fact to be proved at all.
9 J. Wigmore, supra note 9, § 2400, at 4.
17. See 3 A. Corbin, supra note 7, § 573, at 357, § 582, at 448.
18. See Calamari & Perillo, supra note 15, at 337-40 (discussing Williston).
19. See Comment, The Parol Evidence Rule and Third Parties, 41 Fordham L. Rev.
945, 951 (1973).
20. See McCormick, The Parol Evidence Rule as a Procedural Device for Control of
the Jury, 41 Yale L.J. 365, 366 (1932).
21. See Murray, The Parol Evidence Process and Standardized Agreements under the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 123 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1342, 1347 (1975).
22. See Farnsworth, supra note 6, at 865.
Implied terms have been divided into three categories: (1) terms that the parties in-
tended, (2) terms that the parties would have intended had they thought about it and (3)
terms that are fair. The first involves a search for the parties' intention, the second in-
volves a search for the parties' hypothetical intention, the third has nothing to do with
the parties' intention, except that the court will generally not imply a term in the face of
the parties' expressed intent to the contrary. See Williams, Language and the Law-IV,
61 L.Q. Rev. 384, 401 (1945). "Implied in law" or "constructive" terms, see infra note
25, include the second and third categories. See Farnsworth, supra note 6, at 865.
A variation of the first category avoids the inquiry into the actual intention of the
parties by relying on an objective approach: Would a reasonable person in the position of
the other party be justified in concluding that such a promise was made? See Stop &
Shop, Inc. v. Ganem, 347 Mass. 697, 701, 200 N.E.2d 248, 251 (1964); Havel v. Kelsey-
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clear as to whether "implied" terms are imposed by law or implied in
fact. 3 The distinction, however, may have certain consequences on the
operation of the parol evidence rule. 4 This Article will generally adopt
the Second Restatement approach that "implied" terms are usually im-
posed by law,' 5 but will also consider the consequences of treating those
terms as implications of fact.
I. ARE RULES OF LAW PROTECTED BY THE
PAROL EVIDENCE RULE?
The parol evidence rule proceeds from the premise that if the parties to
a contract so intend, they can fully integrate 6 their agreement by as-
Hayes Co., 83 A.D.2d 380, 382, 445 N.Y.S.2d 333, 335 (1981); 11 S. Williston, A Trea-
tise on the Law of Contracts § 1295, at 37 (3d ed. 1968).
23. See, eg., Zone Co. v. Service Trans. Co., 137 NJ.L. 112, 117-18, 57 A.2d 562
565 (1948); Haines v. City of New York, 41 N.Y.2d 769, 772, 364 N.E.2d 820, 822, 396
N.Y.S.2d 155, 157-58 (1977); Lake L.BJ. Mun. Util. Dist. v. Coulson & C.A.E., Inc.,
692 S.W.2d 897, 906 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985). "[lit is very often unnecessary for the court
to distinguish ... between promise implied in fact and promise 'implied by law ... in
order to make a just decision." 3 A. Corbin, supra note 7, § 561, at 280.
24. If the term is implied in fact, but not from the writing alone, it is part of the
parties' agreement not reduced to writing. Thus, it could conceivably be subject to the
parol evidence rule. See supra text accompanying note 11. This result is often avoided by
a process of interpretation. See infra note 179 and accompanying text. If the term is
"implied in law," it is an obligation imposed by law on the parties' agreement and is not
subject to the parol evidence rule. See infra note 156 and accompanying text.
25. See Second Restatement, supra note 2, § 204 comment d. Such terms may be
called "constructive" terms, see 3A A. Corbin, supra note 7, § 632, at 22; Farnsworth,
supra note 6, at 865, or "gap fillers," see E. Farnsworth, Contracts § 7.16, at 523 n.12
(1982), or simply "rules" of law, Nicholas, Rules and Terms--Civil Law and Common
Law, 48 Tul. L. Rev. 946, 948-49 (1974). This Article uses the expression "implied in
law" for the sake of convenient grouping of implied in fact and implied in law terms
under the general heading of "implied terms."
26. The term "integration" is Wigmore's. See 9 J. Wigmore, supra note 9, § 2425, at
75-76. He defines "integration" as the "process of embodying the terms of ajural act in a
single memorial." Id. at 75-76. In connection with this definition, Corbin stated:
Wigmore, whose experience was immense and whose opinion is worth as much
as another's, thought it advisable to adopt the unfamiliar word "integration" in
place of "writing" or "written contract" and to give it his own definition so that
his own meaning in his discussion of the law might be accurately apprehended
by his readers. It is not certain how well he succeeded in this; and in adopting
the new term it is quite possible that new confusion was caused and that it has
been used according to the system of Humpty Dumpty rather than with the
meaning of Wigmore. It certainly has not yet simplified the application of the
"parol evidence rule" or eliminated the previously prevailing variations and
inconsistencies.
3 A. Corbin, supra note 7, § 588, at 528. "Integration" is used by both Corbin, see ILd
§ 573, at 357, and W'lliston, see 4 S. Williston, supra note 9, § 631, at 949, as well as by
both Restatements, see First Restatement, supra note 11, § 228; Second Restatement,
supra note 2, § 209, and numerous judicial opinions, see, eg., Farmer v. Arabian Am. Oil
Co., 277 F.2d 46, 49 (2d Cir.), cerL denied, 364 U.S. 824 (1960); Chism v. Omlie, 239
Miss. 576, 582, 124 So. 2d 286, 289 (1960); Black v. Evergreen Land Developers, Inc., 75
Wash. 2d 249, 257, 450 P.2d 470, 475 (1969).
The First Restatement and other authorities have used the term 'integrated" to mean
'fully integrated." See, eg., Masterson v. Sine, 68 Cal. 2d 222, 225, 436 P.2d 561, 563,
1985]
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senting to a writing as the final and complete expression of their agree-
ment. All agreements reached during negotiations but not included in the
final and complete writing are superseded.27 It is also possible for the
parties to integrate their agreement partially by assenting to the writing
as the final expression of only those terms contained in the writing.28 In
the latter case, inconsistent agreements of the parties are superseded29
but consistent additional terms may be proved.3" When the parties de-
cide to express their agreement in a final writing, are the rules of law that
apply to their agreement as written deemed integrated as well? That is,
does the court read the written contract as though applicable rules of law
are a part of it?
A. "Implied in Law" Terms
Consider a written contract for the repair of a structure. The writing
states no completion date. The owner seeks to introduce evidence of an
oral agreement made prior to the execution of the written contract that
the repairs would be completed within three months. If the parties had
not agreed on a completion date the law would imply an obligation to
complete within a reasonable time.31 May the parties' actual agreement
be proved?32 Because the writing is silent on time for performance, the
fixed completion date is a consistent additional term, operative if the
65 Cal. Rptr. 545, 547 (1968) (en banc); First Restatement, supra note 11, § 228; 4 S.
Williston, supra note 9, § 636, at 1033. This use is misleading because an agreement may
be unintegrated, partially integrated or fully integrated. E. Farnsworth, supra note 25,
§ 7.3, at 452. The Second Restatement carefully distinguishes an integrated agreement
(one expressed in a final writing) from a fully integrated agreement (one expressed in a
final and complete writing). See Second Restatement, supra note 2 §§ 209-10. The UCC
makes a similar distinction, but without using the words "integrated" or "integration."
See U.C.C. § 2-202 (1978) (initial paragraph refers to "final expression"; subsection (b)
refers to "complete and exclusive statement"). This Article maintains the distinction
between an integrated agreement and a fully integrated agreement.
27. See J. Calamari & J. Perillo, supra note 11, § 3-2, at 99; 3 A. Corbin, supra note 7,
§ 573, at 368-69, § 582, at 447-48; First Restatement, supra note 11, § 237; Second Re-
statement, supra note 2, § 213; 4 S. Williston, supra note 9, § 631, at 952-53.
28. See J. Calamari & J. Perillo, supra note 11, § 3-2, at 101. Corbin agrees but advo-
cates abandoning the term "partial integration," because "it. . . seem[s] unlikely that
the parties intended the partial writing to be conclusive as to anything." 3 A. Corbin,
supra note 7, § 581, at 441.
29. See 4 S. Williston, supra note 9, § 636, at 1035 ("[I]f a contract is even partially
reduced to writing, the written portion is no more subject to contradiction by parol than
the entire contract would be had it been wholly reduced to writing.").
30. Id. § 636, at 1033.
31. See J. Calamari & J. Perillo, supra note 11, § 2-13, at 46; see also U.C.C. § 2-
309(1) (1978) (reasonable time for shipment or delivery of goods).
32. Courts disagree on this question. Compare Kansas City Bridge Co. v. Kansas
City Structural Steel Co., 317 S.W.2d 370, 373 (Mo. 1958) (actual agreement prevailed
over reasonable time rule) and Brazil v. Dupree, 197 Or. 581, 597-98, 254 P.2d 1041,
1045 (1953) (same) with California Drilling & Mach. Co. v. Crowder, 58 Cal. App. 529,
532-33, 209 P. 68, 69 (1922) (reasonable time rule prevailed over alleged actual agree-
ment) and Gordon v. Great Lakes Bowling Corp., 18 Mich. App. 358, 366-67, 171
N.W.2d 225, 230 (1969) (same) and Metropolitan St. Ry. v. Broderick & Bascom Rope
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agreement is partially integrated, superseded if the agreement is fully in-
tegrated. If, however, the "reasonable time" rule is deemed to be inte-
grated, the written contract is read as though it stated in writing: "The
repairs will be completed within a reasonable time." Proof of the agreed
fixed completion date is, therefore, automatically excluded because it
contradicts "reasonable time."33 The court need never reach the difficult
question of whether the agreement is fully or partially integrated.
The law governs the parties' agreement; it does not write the agree-
ment. The scope of contractual obligation comprises two components:
the parties' agreement and the rules of law or obligations a court imposes
to fll gaps in the agreement.34 To the extent that the rules of law are not
Co., 156 Mo. App. 640, 644, 137 S.W. 633, 635 (1911) (same), overruled, Kansas City
Bridge Co. v. Kansas City Structural Steel Co., 317 S.W.2d 370 (Mo. 1958).
This division is not limited to time to render a performance. On duration of a continu-
ing performance, compare Reiss v. Usona Shirt Co., 174 A.D. 181, 183, 159 N.Y.S. 1031,
1032-33 (1916) (actual agreement prevailed over hiring at will rule) with Foster v. Atlas
Life Ins. Co., 154 Okla. 30, 33-34, 6 P.2d 805, 808-09 (1931) (hiring at will rule prevailed
over alleged actual agreement). On time of payment, compare Sivers v. Sivers, 97 Cal.
518, 520-21, 32 P. 571, 572 (1893) (actual agreement prevailed over rule that payment of
debt is due on demand) with Balon v. Hotel & Restaurant Supplies, Inc., 6 Ariz. App.
481, 484-85, 433 P.2d 661, 664-65 (1967) (rule that payment is due on receipt of goods
prevailed over alleged actual agreement), vacated, 103 Ariz. 474, 445 P.2d 833 (1968) (en
bane).
The issue frequently arises in sale of goods contracts but is not limited to any particular
type of transaction. See 3 A. Corbin, supra note 7, § 593, at 556. It is the subject of
annotations at 85 A.L.R.2d 1269 (1962) (time for performance) and id. at 1331 (duration
of performance).
The issue can be avoided by taking an interpretation approach. See Delta Dynamics,
Inc. v. Arioto, 69 Cal. 2d 525, 527-29, 446 P.2d 785, 786-87, 72 Cal. Rptr. 785, 786-87
(1968) (en bane). See infra note 124 and accompanying text.
33. Presumably, the offered term will always be, to some extent, inconsistent with the
implied term. Otherwise its introduction into evidence would be superfluous.
34. See U.C.C. § 1-201(3), (11) (1978); see also 3 A. Corbin, supra note 7, § 541, at
95-96 n.69 (discussing the obligation of good faith and fair dealing and citing Lord
Wright's remarks that courts are in a sense making a contract for the parties by compel-
ling payment of a reasonable price); E. Durkheim, The Division of Labor in Society 214
(1964) (Contract law "forces us to assume obligations that we have not contracted for, in
the exact sense of the word, since we have not deliberated upon them"). But see 1 S.
Williston, A Treatise on the Law of Contracts § 3A, at 14 (3d ed. 1957) ("Accuracy of
reasoning requires a recognition of such obligations... as quasi contracts."); Speidel,
The New Spirit of Contract, 2 J. L. & Comm. 193, 208 (1982) ("[A] duty of good faith in
performance and enforcement of a contract imposed without the parties' consent.. . [is
a form of tort].").
Within the context of a contract, so-called "implied in law" obligations should prop-
erly be called contractual obligations though not strictly based on intention. Any refer-
ence to intent merely means absence of intent to the contrary. These obligations are
governed by contract remedies. See Seaman's Direct Buying Serv. v. Standard Oil Co.,
36 Cal. 3d 752, 768, 686 P.2d 1158, 1166, 206 Cal. Rptr. 354, 362 (1984) (contract reme-
dies for breach of implied covenant of good faith have included specific performance,
rescission and damages). Of course, the breach of an implied covenant may also create
tort liability. See id, 686 P.2d at 1166, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 362; Diamond, The Tort of Bad
Faith Breach of Contract" When, If at All Should It Be Extended beyond Insurance
Transactions?, 64 Marq. L. Rev. 425, 425-29 (1981); Komblum, Recent Cases Interpret-
ing the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing, 30 Def. .J. 411, 431-32 n.50
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mandatory, the agreement prevails over rules of law.' 5 When, as in the
repair contract, the parties have reached an agreement displacing the rule
of law, the rule of law is not applicable.36 Thus, courts holding that rules
of law are integrated despite the parties' contrary agreement reverse fun-
damental priorities in determining the terms of the agreement.
If a court holds that the rule of law prevails over the parties' agree-
ment to the contrary, it is because the parol evidence rule which the
court is applying prohibits the court from taking into account the actual
agreement of the parties.37 The parol evidence rule could excludb proof
of the actual agreement on one of two bases: contradiction-the rule of
law is integrated as part of the writing 38-or total integration-the par-
ties intend their writing to express their complete agreement.39
Many cases that purported to use the first basis actually used the sec-
ond.' Therefore, in order to understand the cases concluding that the
implied in law term is integrated, it is necessary to review briefly the
approaches of various authorities in deciding whether an agreement is
fully or partially integrated and to consider how each approach would
treat the offered specific time agreement.4" At least in theory, resolving
(1981). For a case in which the court declined to imply a term and instead granted relief
in restitution, see Nelson v. Gish, 103 Idaho 57, 60, 644 P.2d 980, 983 (1982).
35. E. Farnsworth, supra note 25, § 7.1, at 446; Hawkland, supra note 5, at 206.
Because there are no parol evidence rule issues where an alleged term contradicts a
mandatory rule of law, all references to rules of law in this Article refer to suppletory,
that is non-mandatory, rules of law. See E. Farnsworth, supra note 25, § 7.1, at 446.
36. See Kansas City Bridge Co. v. Kansas City Structural Steel Co., 317 S.W.2d 370,
375 (Mo. 1958) (" 'when an ordinary contract does not state the time for performance,
and the parties orally agree on a particular time,' the legal implication that they intended
a reasonable time is an implication 'fictitiously invented by the law' ") (quoting 3 S. Wil-
liston, Williston on Contracts § 640, at 1840 (rev. ed. 1963)).
37. Although the parol evidence rule may not require an "agreement to the contrary"
to be in writing, a specific statute might. See Masterson v. Sine, 68 Cal. 2d 222, 229, 436
P.2d 561, 566, 65 Cal. Rptr. 545, 550 (1968) (en bane) ("[A] statute may preclude parol
evidence to rebut a statutory presumption."); Martel Constr. Inc. v. Gleason Equip., Inc.,
166 Mont. 479, 482-83, 534 P.2d 883, 884-85 (1975) (where parties entered into written
contract, statute providing that time not of the essence unless contract terms expressly so
provided barred proof of oral agreement that time was of the essence and took precedence
over more "general" UCC parol evidence rule); see also 3 A. Corbin, supra note 7, § 593,
at 561 (statutes which fill gaps in the parties' agreement are "not in aid of the 'parol
evidence rule' "). Under the UCC, an agreement contrary to a rule of law need not neces-
sarily be in writing. See Brunswick Box Co. v. Coutinho, Caro & Co., 617 F.2d 355, 360
(4th Cir. 1980) (court may look beyond written document to determine whether parties
"otherwise agreed").
38. See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
39. See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
40. See infra notes 44-53 and accompanying text.
41. How a court decides whether an integration is total or partial is generally recog-
nized as a key issue under the parol evidence rule. See Calamari & Perillo, supra note 15,
at 337; Murray, supra note 21, at 1351-54. This Article addresses this issue only tangen-
tially as it relates to the question of whether implied terms are deemed integrated. For
commentary comparing the differing views, see Calamari & Perillo, supra note 15, at 337-
45 (comparing Williston and Corbin); Metzger, The Parol Evidence Rule: Promissory Es.
toppel's Next Conquest?, 36 Vand. L. Rev. 1383, 1392-97 (1983) (comparing Williston,
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the issue of whether an agreement is fully or partially integrated depends
on the intent of the parties.4 2 Accordingly, we should consider in each
case what test of intent is used and what extrinsic evidence of intent is
considered by the court.'
1. The "Four Comers" Rule
Under the earliest approach,' the question of total or partial integra-
tion was decided solely by the apparent completeness of the writing-the
"four comers" approach.45 If the writing appeared complete on its face,
the agreement was conclusively presumed to be fully integrated." If the
writing was incomplete on its face, the agreement was only partially
integrated.47
The difficult question under the "four corners" approach was deciding
whether a particular writing was facially incomplete. When the writing
itself referred to a separate agreement or indicated that other agreements
existed, for example, by referring to a telephone conversation, the agree-
ment generally was held to be partially integrated.4" But when the writ-
ing simply omitted an essential term such as time for performance, the
decisions were not uniform.49 Most courts excluded proof of the offered
Corbin, the UCC and the Second Restatement); Wallach, The Declining "Sanctity" of
Written Contracts-Impact of the Uniform Commercial Code on the Parl Evidence Rule,
44 Mo. L. Rev. 651, 656-68 (1979) (comparing pre-Code approaches to parol evidence
rule).
42. See E. Farnsworth, supra note 25, § 7.3, at 452.
43. The question of intent, ordinarily a question of fact, is decided by the court. Id. at
460. But see infra note 86 (discussing Corbin's view).
44. See McCormick, supra note 20, at 369-71 (1932); Wallach, supra note 41, at 656-
58; Is It Necessary?, supra note 7, at 973-75.
45. See, eg., Seitz v. Brewers' Refrigerating Mach. Co., 141 U.S. 510, 517 (1891); In
re Simplot's Estate, 215 Iowa 578, 582, 246 N.W. 396, 398 (1933); Grant v. King, 117
Minn. 54, 57, 134 N.W. 291, 292 (1912); Thompson v. Libbey, 34 Minn. 374, 377, 26
N.W. 1, 2 (1885); Davis v. Ferguson, 111 Neb. 691, 696, 197 N.W. 390, 392 (1924);
Naumberg v. Young, 44 NJ.L. 331, 339 (1882). The "four comers" approach has been
applied relatively recently. See Gulf Ati. Towing Corp. v. Dickerson, Inc., 271 F.2d 542,
545-46 (5th Cir. 1959). But see United States v. Clementon Sewerage Auth., 365 F.2d
609, 613-14 (3d Cir. 1966) (criticizing "four comers" approach); J. Murray, Contracts
§ 108, at 236 (2d rev. ed. 1974) ("IT]here is no modem court which would not listen to
evidence of the extrinsic matter (as well as inspecting the writing itself) to determine the
integration questions."); Wallach, supra note 41, at 656 (rule today is "largely of histori-
cal interest").
46. See, e-g., Seitz v. Brewers' Refrigerating Mach. Co., 141 U.S. 510, 517 (1891); In
re Simplot's Estate, 215 Iowa 578, 582, 246 N.W. 396, 398 (1933).
47. See, eg., Sutton v. Weber, 127 Iowa 361, 366-67, 101 N.W. 775, 777-78 (1904);
Caputo v. Continental Constr. Corp., 340 Mass. 15, 18, 162 N.F.2d 813, 816 (1959);
Wimn v. Chamberlin, 32 Vt. 318, 320-22 (1859).
48. See, e.g., American Bridge Co. v. Crawford, 31 F.2d 708, 710 (3d Cir. 1929);
Caputo v. Continental Constr. Corp., 340 Mass. 15, 18 & n.1, 162 N.E.2d 813, 814-16 &
n.1 (1959).
49. Compare Stahelin v. Sowle, 87 Mich. 124, 132-34, 49 N.W. 529, 532 (1891) (par-
tial integration) and Winn v. Chamberlin, 32 Vt. 318, 320-22 (1859) (same) with First
State Bank v. Noel, 94 Mo. App. 498, 503, 68 S.W. 235, 236 (1902) (total integration)
and Gale Mfg. Co. v. Finkelstein, 59 S.W. 571, 571-72 (Tex. Civ. App. 1900) (same).
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term,5 0 apparently assuming from the writing's silence that the parties
had not agreed to a specific time for performance. But because the test of
total integration was the facial completeness of the document, these
courts frequently justified their holdings by stating that the rule of law,
"reasonable time," was read into the writing and thereby completed it.5'
On the other hand, a minority of cases decided under the "four comers"
approach concluded that a writing omitting an essential term was incom-
plete on its face (a partial integration), and thus admitted proof of the
offered term to supplement the written agreement.5 2
Though the two lines of cases reached opposite results, the reasoning
of both was based on the same incorrect premise: that the writing is the
contract.5 3 The former found it necessary, in order to complete the writ-
ing, to treat the rules of law as though they were part of the document.
The latter failed to recognize that if the parties have agreed to only three
terms, a writing that expresses those terms is complete though the con-
tract would include obligations supplied by law to fill the gaps. The basic
failing of both lines of decisions stems from the attempt to decide the
50. See, e.g., First State Bank v. Noel, 94 Mo. App. 498, 503, 68 S.W. 235, 236
(1902); Cameron Coal & Mercantile Co. v. Universal Metal Co., 26 Okla. 615, 616-17,
110 P. 720, 720 (1910); Retailers Serv. Bureau v. Smith, 165 S.C. 238, 246-47, 163 S.E.
649, 652 (1932); Hayden v. Hoadley, 94 Vt. 345, 348, 111 A. 343, 344-45 (1920).
51. See, e.g., Gardiner v. McDonogh, 147 Cal. 313, 319, 81 P. 964, 966 (1905) (en
banc) (read in "reasonable time" to perform); California Drilling & Mach. Co. v.
Crowder, 58 Cal. App. 529, 531, 209 P. 68, 69 (1922) (same); Standard Box Co. v. Mu-
tual Biscuit Co., 10 Cal. App. 746, 750, 103 P. 938, 939-40 (1909) (same); Metropolitan
St. Ry. v. Broderick & Bascom Rope Co., 156 Mo. App. 640, 644, 137 S.W. 633, 635
(1911) (same), overruled, Kansas City Bridge Co. v. Kansas City Structural Steel Co., 317
S.W.2d 370 (Mo. 1958); see also Union Special Sewing Mach. Co. v. Lockwood, 110 111.
App. 387, 390 (1903) (parol evidence inadmissible to contradict legal presumption of
hiring at will).
As Justice Traynor explained in a leading case rejecting this approach: "Virtually
every writing leaves some terms to be implied and almost none would qualify as [total]
integrations without implying some terms. The decision[s] [were] therefore a product of
an outmoded approach to the parol evidence rule, not of any compulsion to give conclu-
sive effect to presumptions of implied terms." Masterson v. Sine, 68 Cal. 2d 222, 229-30
n.3, 436 P.2d 561, 566 n.3, 65 Cal. Rptr. 545, 550 n.3 (1968) (en banc). In Masterson, the
argument was made that parol evidence to show restricted trasferability of the grantor's
option to repurchase property would contradict the deed creating the option because
under California law the unrestricted option was freely transferable. The court rejected
the argument stating, "the fact that there is a written memorandum. . . does not neces-
sarily preclude parol evidence rebutting a term that the law would otherwise presume."
l at 229, 436 P.2d at 565, 65 Cal. Rptr. at 549. For a discussion of Masterson, see Note,
Chief Justice Traynor and the Parol Evidence Rule, 22 Stan. L. Rev. 547, 553-55 (1970);
Is it Necessary?, supra note 7, at 977-82; 56 Cal. L. Rev. 1671, 1671-76 (1968).
52. See, e.g., Stahelin v. Sowle, 87 Mich. 124, 132-35, 49 N.W. 529, 532 (1891); Dun-
nett & Slack v. Gibson, 78 Vt. 439, 443-44, 63 A. 141, 142 (1906), overruled, Hayden v.
Hoadley, 94 Vt. 345, 111 A. 343 (1920).
53. The total contractual obligation comprises both the agreement of the parties and
obligations imposed by law. See supra note 34 and accompanying text. A written con-
tract, if complete, expresses the entire agreement between the parties, but not the entire
contractual obligation.
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question of whether an agreement is fully or partially integrated by look-
ing within the "four corners" of the document.
2. Williston and the First Restatement
Williston's test for determining whether an integration is total or par-
tial is a liberalization of the "four comers" test' because, under Willis-
ton's test, facial completeness of the writing does not necessarily result in
finding a total integration." Under Williston's highly influential test,
adopted by the Restatement of Contracts (First Restatement), 6 even if a
written contract is deemed complete on its face, a consistent additional
term may be proved if the term is one that parties similarly situated
would naturally make and not include in the writing.5 7 The First Re-
statement drafters recognized that "there are cases where it is so natural
to make a separate agreement, frequently oral, in regard to the same sub-
ject matter, that the Parol Evidence Rule does not deny effect to the
collateral agreement."5"
Williston's rule is similar to the "four comers" approach in at least
one respect, however. It is a formalistic test of presumed, not actual,
intention of the parties to fully integrate their agreement.5 9 Little or no
extrinsic evidence need be considered because the question is not what
the parties did but what parties similarly situated might normally do.'
54. See Wallach, supra note 41, at 660.
55. See J. Calamari & ". Perillo, supra note 11, § 3-3, at 105; 4 S. Williston, supra note
9, § 633, at 1014-16; see also First Restatement, supra note 11, § 229 comment a.
56. See First Restatement, supra note 11, § 240(1)(b).
57. See 4 S. Williston, supra note 9, § 638, at 1039-42; see also FIrst Restatement,
supra note 11, § 240(l)(b).
58. First Restatement, supra note 11, § 240 comment d. If the alleged collateral
agreement can stand alone as an independent contract between the same parties, it is
admissible to provide consistent additional terms without inquiring whether it would
have been naturally included in the writing. See J. Calamari & J. Perillo, supra note 11,
§ 3-3, at 105; 3 A. Corbin, supra note 7, § 584, at 477; First Restatement, supra note 11,
§ 240; Second Restatement, supra note 2, § 216(2)(a). The discussion throughout this
Article assumes that the offered agreement depends for its validity on the consideration
stated in the writing.
59. See 4 S. Williston, supra note 9, § 638, at 1037-42; see also Calamari & Perillo,
supra note 15, at 337-45 (distinguishing Williston's test of presumed intention from
Corbin's inquiry into actual intent). The test has been called a "reasonable man" test of
intention, see Wallach, supra note 41, at 659, the "normal and natural" test, see Sweet,
supra note 7, at 1038, the "naturalness" test, see Strahorn, The Paro! Evidence Rule and
Warranties of Goods Sold, 19 Minn. L. Rev. 725, 728 (1935) and the "natural omission"
test, see Murray, supra note 21, at 1366.
60. See 4 S. Williston, supra note 9, § 638, at 1041 ("The point is not merely whether
the court is convinced that the parties before it did in fact do this, but whether parties so
situated generally would or might do so."). Comments to the First Restatement, how-
ever, seem to be more liberal and to permit broader inquiry into the parties' intent. See
First Restatement, supra note 11, § 240 comment d ("It is not essential that a particular
provision would always or even usually be made in a separate collateral agreement. It is
enough that making such a provision in that way is not so exceptional as to be odd or
unnatural."); see also id. § 228 comment a ("That a document was or was not adopted as
an integration may be proved by any relevant evidence."). Corbin argues that "[w]hether
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As a practical matter, Williston's "naturalness" test is a test not only
for admission of the evidence but also for exclusion of the evidence. If a
consistent additional term would naturally be omitted from the writing it
may be proved (the agreement is only partially integrated), but if it
would naturally be included in the writing proof of it is barred (the agree-
ment is fully integrated).61
How does Williston's rule apply in the case in which the parties have
agreed to a stated completion date but have not included the date in the
writing? Williston severely criticized the cases that, under the four cor-
ners approach, read in the rule of law "reasonable time" in order to ex-
clude proof of the actual agreement.62 He approved the results of cases
that admitted proof of the actual agreement in preference to applying the
"reasonable time" rule, but it is not clear from his discussion on what
basis proof of the oral agreement is admissible.63 It would seem that his
"naturalness" test would be even more restrictive than the "four cor-
ners" or "facial completeness" test when applied to a case in which an
essential term, such as time of performance, is omitted from the writing.
The absence from the writing of a term fixing the time for performance is
an important omission. By the same token, an alleged agreement fixing a
time for performance is such an integral part of the transaction that if the
agreement were intended to be part of the contract, one might ordinarily
expect the parties to have included it in the writing. Therefore, a court
applying an approach to total integration which depends on the facial
completeness of the writing could conceivably conclude that the agree-
ment is only partially integrated, whereas a court applying an approach
that depends on whether the term is natural to include would generally
conclude that the agreement is fully integrated. Thus, if the agreed com-
pletion date had to pass Williston's "naturalness" test, its proof would
ordinarily be barred, a result contrary to that which Williston intended."a
Presumably to avoid this anomalous conclusion and reach the desired
result, the First Restatement indicates that the agreed fixed time term is a
naturally omitted term. It uses the following illustration to exemplify an
agreement that "'might naturally be made' without inclusion in an inte-
grated contract": 65
or not it was 'natural' for the parties to do as they did bears only on the credibility of the
evidence offered." See 3 A. Corbin, supra note 7, § 584, at 480.
61. See 4 S. Williston, supra note 9, § 638, at 1040-42; see also First Restatement,
supra note 11, § 240 & comment c. The statement in the text assumes that the writing is
deemed apparently complete. See supra text accompanying notes 55-57 and infra text
accompanying note 71.
62. See 4 S. Williston, supra note 9, § 640, at 1054-60.
63. See id. § 640, at 1051-63.
64. See id. § 640, at 1057 n.8 ("more progressive and realistic" to admit evidence of
actual agreement "instead of imposing the harsh and arbitrary reasonable time doctrine")
(emphasis in original).
65. First Restatement, supra note 11, § 240 comment d. The First Restatement's
"naturalness" test, when applied in this context, seems so out of place that it is hard to
imagine that it would have been used absent the necessity of including the case within the
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A and B in an integrated contract respectively promise to sell and to
buy specified goods. No time or place for delivery is specified. If no
agreement is made as to these matters the rule of law is that the goods
are deliverable in a reasonable time at the seller's place of business. A
contemporaneous oral agreement that the goods shall be delivered
within thirty days, at the buyer's place of business, is operative.66
Not surprisingly, the courts have not found the "naturalness" test helpful
in this context.6 7 The few cases that cite the First Restatement on this
issue appear to place their reliance primarily on the illustration" rather
black letter. WVilliston's treatise avoids the issue but, if anything, indicates blanket admis-
sibility: "'Mhe written memorial does not purport to be complete upon its face and the
extrinsic evidence does not therefore serve to vary or contradict it."' 4 S. Williston,
supra note 9, § 640, at 1061 (quoting Marcus & Co. v. K.LG. Baking Co., 122 NJ.L
202, 207, 3 A.2d 627, 630 (1939)).
The First Restatement's conclusion that the time for performance is a naturally omit-
ted term reveals the underlying purpose of the test as a threshold test of credibility of the
evidence: It is not unusual for parties to fix a time for performance, and, it is therefore
natural to conclude that some such agreement was made. The test is thereby satisfied.
Thus, the "naturalness" test is not necessarily limited to the question of whether it
would have been natural for the parties to include the term in the writing. Rather, it
questions whether it is natural to conclude that such an agreement was reached and con-
tinues to be a viable part of the agreement despite the writing. A contemporaneous oral
agreement, as in the illustration, might meet the test more easily than one reached very
early in the negotiating process. See First Restatement, supra note 11, § 240 comment d;
see also id. § 240(1)(b) ill 2-7 (five of six illustrations of agreements that "might naturally
be made" are "contemporaneous oral" terms); Sweet, supra note 7, at 1065 (written
agreement less likely to be fully integrated if oral agreement was made after final contract
was prepared for execution).
66. First Restatement, supra note 11, § 240(1)(b) U1L 4; see id. § 240(l)(b) ilL 5 (omis-
sion of route of shipment agreement from writing).
The First Restatement illustration could indicate that the completion date agreement is
always operative because such a term is natural to omit from the writing. A comment,
however, injects initial doubt by indicating that the offered term must still meet the test of
consistency with the integration. See First Restatement, supra note 11, § 240 comment c.
The offered term would be inconsistent with the integration if there is "a clear implication
of fact from the writing that it fully expresses the whole bargain in regard to the matter in
question." Id; see 4 S. Williston, supra note 9, § 639, at 1048 (discussing same implica-
tion). Can a writing that omits an essential term ever contain an implication of fact that
it "expresses the whole bargain in regard to the matter in question" without an express
statement to that effect in something like a merger clause? See infra note 91. The First
Restatement illustration, see supra text accompanying note 66, and Williston's treatise
suggest that the answer is no. See 4 S. Williston, supra note 9, § 640, at 1061.
This implication may be merely another way of asking the "naturalness" question. See
Mitchill v. Lath, 247 N.Y. 377, 385-86, 160 N.E. 646, 649 (1928) (Lehman, J., dissent-
ing). Williston recognized that there is an overlap between the "naturalness" test and the
consistency test:
Whether... a collateral agreement tends to contradict the implications of the
writing... will depend in large measure on the question whether a reasonable
person making such an agreement as is set up both in the writing and in the
proferred parol evidence might naturally have separated the matters into two
parts.
4 S. Williston, supra note 9, § 639, at 1051.
67. See infra notes 68-69.
68. See, e.g., Kansas City Bridge Co. v. Kansas City Structural Steel Co., 317 S.W.2d
370, 375 (Mo. 1958); Brazil v. Dupree, 197 Or. 581, 597, 254 P.2d 1041, 1044-45 (1953).
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than on the "natural to omit" rationale, but most cases that admit proof
of the oral agreement resort to the "incomplete on its face" approach.69
Even Williston does not apply the "naturalness" test in this context.
On the contrary, he appears to approve of the cases which have used the
"incomplete on its face" rationale.70 Thus, Williston seems to be sub-
stantially in accord with the minority "four comers" cases that con-
cluded that the omission of an essential term indicated that the writing
was a partial integration.71 Interestingly, the First Restatement's solu-
tion is exactly the opposite. It indicates that a written contract which
lacks only a time for performance term is complete on its face but an oral
agreement fixing time for performance is natural to omit, and may there-
fore be proved.
3. Wigmore's Rule
The Wigmore approach to the question of total or partial integration
departs from both the "four comers" and the Williston approaches be-
cause Wigmore seeks the actual intent of the parties based on all relevant
evidence.7 2 However, Wigmore's "chief and most satisfactory" test for
determining the parties' intent is a formalistic one: "whether or not the
particular element of the alleged extrinsic negotiation is dealt with at all in
the writing."' "7 In the illustration under consideration the answer is no,
and therefore the offered term is "probably" admissible.7 4 Although the
"four comers" and the Williston approaches generally assume total inte-
69. See, e-g., Stahelin v. Sowle, 87 Mich. 124, 130, 49 N.W. 529, 532 (1891); Marcus
& Co. v. K.L.G. Baking Co., 122 N.J.L. 202, 207, 3 A.2d 627, 630 (1939); Dunnett &
Slack v. Gibson, 78 Vt. 439, 443-44, 63 A. 141, 142 (1906), overruled, Hayden v.
Hoadley, 94 Vt. 345, 111 A. 343 (1920).
70. See 4 S. Williston, supra note 9, § 640, at 1061 (discussing Marcus & Co. v.
K.L.G. Baking Co., 122 N.J.L. 202, 3 A.2d 627 (1939)).
71. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
The First Restatement uses two primary criteria for admitting evidence of an extrinsic
agreement: 1) the writing is incomplete on its face and 2) the term is one that would
naturally be omitted. See First Restatement, supra note 11, § 240 comments a, d. The
First Restatement, however, emphasizes that the first criterion may be used only if the
writing itself shows that it is incomplete. See id. comment a. The First Restatement's use
of the second criterion to admit proof of the oral agreement indicates that it views a
writing omitting time for performance as complete on its face (though not containing an
implication of fact that it expresses the whole bargain, see supra note 66) because the
"naturalness" test comes into play only when the writing is complete on its face. Willis-
ton uses the same two criteria, see 4 S. Williston, supra note 9, § 633, at 1014-15, § 638, at
1041, but appears to admit the term because the writing "does not purport to be complete
upon its face." See idL § 640, at 1061.
72. See 9 J. Wigmore, supra note 9, § 2430, at 98 ('This intent must be sought where
always intent must be sought, namely, in the conduct and language of the parties and the
surrounding circumstances.") (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
73. Id. § 2430, at 99 (emphasis in original). The truth of the offered evidence is as-
sumed for the purpose of making a ruling on its admissibility under the parol evidence
rule. See id
74. See id. ("If it is mentioned, covered, or dealt with in the writing, then presumably
the writing was meant to represent all of the transaction on that element; if it is not, then
probably the writing was not intended to embody that element of the negotiation.").
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gration when a writing is apparently complete," Wigmore's test does
not seem to assume that the integration is either total or partial 7 6 In-
stead, Wigmore's test attempts to determine whether the parties' "writ-
ing was intended to cover a certain subject of negotiation."'
4. The Uniform Commercial Code Section 2-202
The Code rejects the assumption that "because a writing has been
worked out which is final on some matters, it is to be taken as including
all the matters agreed upon ... "78 Under the Code, an agreement is
assumed to be partially integrated "unless the court finds the writing to
have been intended also as a complete and exclusive statement of the
terms of the agreement."79 Although neither the Code nor the official
comments state what extrinsic evidence the court should consider, many
decisions have held that the court should consider all relevant evidence
on the issue of intent."0 Thus, in a sale of goods case, agreement on a
specific date should be provable unless the parties intend a total
integration.8 '
75. See supra note 46 and accompanying text ("four comers") and 4 S. Williston,
supra note 9, § 633, at 1014-15 (ordinarily, written contract must be incomplete on its
face before evidence of an additional term is admissible).
76. Wigmore's test avoids the quandary under the "four comers" approach of at-
tempting to decide on the basis of facial completeness alone whether an agreement is fully
or partially integrated. Seesupra notes 50-53 and accompanying text. Williston criticizes
Wigmore's test because it is difficult to identify "the particular element of the [alleged]
extrinsic negotiation." See 4 S. Williston, supra note 9, § 639, at 1049. But it is equally
difficult to identify "the matter in question" in Williston's "implication. . .that [the
writing] fully expresses the whole bargain in regard to the matter in question." IdL at
1048. See supra note 66.
77. See 9 J. Wigmore, supra note 9, § 2430, at 99 (emphasis in original).
78. U.C.C. § 2-202 official comment l(a) (1978). Thus the Code clearly rejects the
"four comers" approach. See Wallach, supra note 41, at 667.
For commentary on the Code's parol evidence rule, see J. White & R. Summers, Hand-
book of the Law Under the Uniform Commercial Code §§ 2-9 to -12 (2d ed. 1980) [here-
inafter cited as J. White & R. Summers]; Axelrod, Application of UCG 2-202-The
Integrated Agreement, 12 Cap. U.L. Rev. 1 (1982); Broude, supra note 14; Hawkland,
supra note 5, at 208-19; McDonough, The Parol Evidence Rule in South Dakota and the
Effect of Section 2-202 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 10 S.D.L. Rev. 60 (1965); Wal-
lach, supra note 41.
79. U.C.C. § 2-202(b) (1978). The Code eliminates the presumption that a written
contract is a total integration. See S. M. Wilson & Co. v. Smith Int'l, Inc., 587 F.2d 1363,
1371 (9th Cir. 1978); Michael Schiavone & Sons, Inc. v. Securalloy Co., 312 F. Supp. 801,
804 (D. Conn. 1970); Anderson & Nafziger v. G.T. Newcomb, Inc., 100 Idaho 175, 180,
595 P.2d 709, 714 (1979); Zwierzycki v. Owens, 499 P.2d 996, 997 (Wyo. 1972).
80. See, eg., Lakeside Bridge & Steel Co. v. Mountain State Constr. Co., 400 F. Supp.
273, 277-78 (E.D. Wis. 1975); Anderson & Nafziger v. G.T. Newcomb, Inc., 100 Idaho
175, 180, 595 P.2d 709, 714 (1979); Morgan v. Stokely-Van Camp, Inc., 34 Wash. App.
801, 808, 663 P.2d 1384, 1389 (1983); see also Wallach, supra note 41, at 668 (trial judge
is to look at all surrounding circumstances to determine the intent of the parties at the
time of execution of the contract).
81. See Anderson & Nafziger v. G.T. Newcomb, Inc., 100 Idaho 175, 181, 595 P.2d
709, 715 (1979) (evidence of oral delivery date admissible unless parties intended total
integration); George v. Davoli, 91 Misc. 2d 296, 298-99, 397 N.Y.S.2d 895, 897 (Civ. Ct.
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Although the intention of the parties is the only textual limitation to
the introduction of evidence of a consistent additional term, an official
comment adds: "If the additional terms are such that, if agreed upon,
they would certainly have been included in the document in the view of
the court, then evidence of their alleged making must be kept from the
trier of fact." 2 This statement has generally been construed as adding a
second ground of exclusion to the intention test stated in the text.83
Could proof of the specific time for performance agreement be excluded
under the "certain to include" test? The answer should be no. The test
is obviously derived from the First Restatement test. 4 If it was not a
term that would have been naturally included in the writing under the
First Restatement test, then a fortiori it is not a term that would certainly
be included under the official comment to UCC section 2-202.11
1977) (same). The UCC makes clear that both parties must evidence this intent. See
U.C.C. § 2-202 official comment 3 (1978).
82. U.C.C. § 2-202 official comment 3 (1978).
83. See, eg., Luria Bros. & Co. v. Pielet Bros. Scrap Iron & Metal, Inc., 600 F.2d 103,
111 (7th Cir. 1979); Braund, Inc. v. White, 486 P.2d 50, 56 (Alaska 1971); Birsner v.
Bolles, 20 Cal. App. 3d 635, 637-38, 97 Cal. Rptr. 846, 847-48 (1971); Hawkland, supra
note 5, at 219; Wallach, supra note 41, at 668. Under this construction the UCC official
comment seems objectionable as going beyond the text. Although this issue was raised by
the New York State Law Revision Commission, 1 New York State Law Revision Com-
mission, Report and Appendices Relating to the Uniform Commercial Code 368 app. IV
(1956), the courts have not expressed the same concern. The reason may be that the
courts are accustomed to excluding evidence of offered terms by applying fictitious tests
of intent to fully integrate the agreement. See Calamari & Perillo, supra note 15, at 339-
40.
84. As Professor Murray explained, "[t]his is the Williston test in a different garb."
Murray, supra note 21, at 1369.
85. For a rare case that considered the certainty test in this context, see George v.
Davoli, 91 Misc. 2d 296, 397 N.Y.S.2d 895 (Civ. Ct. 1977). Plaintiff (buyer) bought
jewelry from defendant (seller) on approval pursuant to a memorandum of sale that did
not state any time limit for return if the goods were found unacceptable. Id. at 296-97,
397 N.Y.S.2d at 896. Absent agreement of the parties, the Code would require return
within a reasonable time. Id at 298, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 897; see U.C.C. §§ 2-326, -327
(1978). At trial, seller was permitted to testify, over objection, that the parties had
reached a contemporaneous oral agreement that the goods had to be returned by a spe-
cific date. See George, 91 Misc. 2d at 297, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 896. In deciding to admit the
oral agreement as a consistent additional term the court, after stating "it cannot be said
that the written memorandum is a complete and exclusive statement of the terms of the
agreement since the time of return is an important part of the arrangement between the
parties," proceeded to ask: "Is it therefore such an additional term that the parties would
certainly have included it in the written document if it had been agreed upon. . . " Id.
at 298, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 897. Relying on Hunt Foods and Indus. v. Doliner, 26 A.D.2d
41, 270 N.Y.S.2d 937 (1966), the court held that it is not such a term because the alleged
oral agreement "cannot be precluded as a matter of law or as factually impossible. It is
not sufficient that [its] . . . existence. . . is implausible. It must be impossible." George,
91 Misc. 2d at 299, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 897 (emphasis in original) (citation omitted). The
Hunt Foods criterion for certainty has been criticized as eliminating the last vestige of a
rule of form from the UCC parol evidence rule because under the Hunt Foods definition,
the certainty test becomes a pure test of credibility. See Wallach, supra note 41, at 671-
72.
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5. Corbin's Approach
Under Corbin's approach proof of the offered term should ordinarily
not reach the trier of fact 6 if no credible evidence supports it or if the
parties intended to discharge it by their subsequent agreement." The
first question, credibility, should be addressed squarely, without resort to
the parol evidence rule as a subterfuge. The second question should be
decided using all relevant evidence. 88 Because the second question is
based on the actual expressed intentions of the particular parties in-
volved, what similarly situated parties would normally have done is not
determinative.89
Corbin makes clear that the rule of law, reasonable time, is not inte-
grated and that therefore a contemporaneous oral agreement stating a
completion date is operative.9' Whether a prior agreement on a specific
completion date is operative would presumably depend on whether the
parties intended to discharge the prior agreement. A merger clause as-
sented to by both parties could, of course, evidence that intention. 91
6. The Second Restatement Rule
The Second Restatement was intended to liberalize the First Restate-
ment rule but not to go quite as far as Corbin would have wished.' Like
86. See 3 A. Corbin, supra note 7, § 595, at 570-71; see also id. at 571, ("There must
be many cases, however, in which the evidence of what the parties said and did, before
and at the time of preparing or delivering a writing, is so nearly equal in weight and
credibility that the court will desire the aid of a jury's verdict. If so, there is no law
against getting such aid.").
87. See id. § 582, at 457. For further commentary on the parol evidence rule by
Corbin, see id. §§ 532-96; Corbin, The Interpretation of Words and the Parol Evidence
Rule, 50 Cornell L.Q. 161 (1965); Corbin, The Parol Evidence Rule, 53 Yale l.J. 603
(1944).
88. See J. Calamari & J. Perillo, supra note 11, § 3-3, at 108-09; 3 A. Corbin, supra
note 7, § 588, at 529.
89. See 3 A. Corbin, supra note 7, § 584, at 480; see also United States v. Clementon
Sewerage Auth., 365 F.2d 609, 613-14 (3d Cir. 1966) (following Corbin's approach, court
admitted evidence of an oral cost limit even though it would be usual to include it in the
writing).
90. See 3 A. Corbin, supra note 7, § 593, at 556-57 (weight of authority and better
reason support this view). But under Corbin's view, evidence of a simultaneous oral term
is always relevant. See supra note 11.
91. See 3 A. Corbin, supra note 7, § 578, at 402-03, 411; see also Comment, The
"Merger Clause" and the Parol Evidence Rule, 27 Tex. L. Rev. 361, 362-364 (1949)
(merger clause is a "clear answer" to the question of the parties' intent) [hereinafter cited
as Merger Clause]. A merger or integration clause is a provision that states that the
writing "contains the entire agreement of the parties." J. Calamari & J. Perillo, supra
note 11, § 3-3, at 104. For examples of merger clauses, see Willson v. Riddle, 128 Conn.
100, 102, 20 A.2d 402, 403 (1941) ("There is no agreement, verbal or otherwise, which is
not set down herein.") and Rinaudo v. Bloom, 209 Md.1, 9, 120 A.2d 184, 189 (1956)
('This Contract contains the final and entire Agreement between the parties.").
92. The Reporter of the Second Restatement, Judge Robert Braucher, has explained:
I had started with the original formulation in the First Restatement, and with
Professor Corbin's notes which left very little of the parol evidence rule, and
took, I think, a ground that went somewhat short of what Professor Corbin
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the Code, the Second Restatement assumes a partial integration "unless
the court finds that the agreement was completely integrated."93 Like
Corbin,94 it directs the court to decide the question of total integration by
determining the actual intent of the parties based on all relevant
evidence. 95
It is somewhat surprising, therefore, to find that the Second Restate-
ment's illustration involving a specific time for performance is more re-
strictive than that in the First Restatement:
In May A and B exchange properties and agree orally that A will make
certain repairs on the property to be conveyed by A to B, the repairs to
be finished by October 1. A and B then draw up and sign a memoran-
dum of the repair agreement, specifying all the terms except that the
memorandum is silent as to time of performance. If the memorandum
is a binding completely integrated agreement, the agreement to finish
by October 1 is discharged, and the repairs are to be finished within a
reasonable time. The oral agreement as to October 1 may be relevant
evidence as to what is a reasonable time.96
The illustration is based on the 1920 case of Hayden v. Hoadley,97 which
applied the "four corners" approach to exclude the oral agreement. 98
would have liked. I took my lead in this draft largely from the section of the
Uniform Commercial Code which deals with the parol evidence rule [section 2-
202] as it applies to contracts for the sale of goods.
1971 ALI Proceedings, supra note 11, at 442.
93. Second Restatement, supra note 2, § 216(1).
94. A notable departure from Corbin's approach is the Second Restatement's applica-
tion of the parol evidence rule to contemporaneous expressions. See Second Restatement,
supra note 2, § 215. See supra note 11.
Although the Second Restatement primarily reflects the Corbin view, scattered
throughout the comments are references to other approaches including the "appearance
of the writing" test, Wigmore's test, and, most notably, Williston's "naturalness" test.
See Murray, supra note 21, at 1356-72. "RTo the detriment of courts and lawyers who
look to the [Second] Restatement for guidance, virtually every view appears to be repre-
sented." Murray, The Standardized Agreement Phenomena in the Restatement (Second)
of Contracts, 67 Cornell L. Rev. 735, 738 (1982).
In fact it may be virtually impossible to have any more than a partial integration under
the Second Restatement. Comment a of Section 213 states: "Where writings relating to
the same subject matter are assented to as parts of one transaction, both form part of the
integrated agreement. Where an agreement is partly oral and partly written, the writing
is at most a partially integrated agreement." Second Restatement, supra note 2, § 213
comment a.
95. Second Restatement, supra note 2, § 210 comment b, § 214(b).
96. Second Restatement, supra note 2, § 213 ill. 3.
97. 97 Vt. 345, 111 A. 343 (1920).
98. Id at 348, 111 A. at 344-45 ("A written contract which contains no latent ambi-
guity cannot be qualified, controlled, contradicted, enlarged, or diminished by any con-
temporaneous or antecedent understanding or agreement; and oral testimony can no
more be received to vary or contradict the legal intendment of such a contract than to
vary or contradict its express terms."). The Second Restatement uses this case to illus-
trate the effect of § 213, comment c on the scope of the integration. Compare id. at 347-
48, 111 A. at 344, with Second Restatement, supra note 2, § 213 ill. 3. Professor Murray
argues that because the Second Restatement agrees with Corbin and Williston that gap
fillers are not integrated and are therefore not protected by the parol evidence rule, see
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Thus, the illustration appears not only more restrictive than the First
Restatement9 9 but also more restrictive than those cases applying the
"four comers" approach which admitted the evidence on the reasoning
that the document was incomplete on its face.lco
To understand the illustration we must understand the broad outlines
of the Second Restatement's rules on total integration. Under the Sec-
ond Restatement, an agreement cannot be totally integrated if the writing
omits an offered term that is: beyond the scope of the writing' °" agreed to
for a separate consideration"ca or naturally omitted from the writing."0 3
The Second Restatement carries forward the First Restatement's "natu-
ralness" test but solely as a test of admissibility of proof of the offered
term.1" Under the First Restatement, the test operates as a test of exclu-
sion as well; i.e., if the term would have naturally been included in an
apparently complete written contract proof of the term was barred. 5
Under the Second Restatement, the "naturalness" test is solely a rule of
admisssion, not a rule of exclusion. The Second Restatement adopts the
Corbin approach, stating:
Where is no rule or policy penalizing a party merely because his mode
of agreement does not seem natural to others. Even though the omis-
sion does not seem natural, evidence of the consistent additional terms
is admissible unless the court finds that the writing was intended as a
complete and exclusive statement of the terms of the agreement.106
The Reporter's Note makes clear that only a consistent additional term
that would be natural to include in the writing could be rendered inoper-
ative by the parol evidence rule and even then, only on a finding that the
agreement is fully integrated. 7 Thus, the Second Restatement's illus-
tration recognizes that, as a matter of logic, an agreed time for perform-
Second Restatement, supra note 2, § 216 comment b, it would have been possible for the
Second Restatement to have declared that the agreement fixing time is outside the scope
of the integration. See Murray, supra note 21, at 1365-66. The illustration indicates,
however, that the agreement fixing time is within the scope of the integration. Professor
Murray points out that the scope test is really part of the natural to omit test. Id. at
1366-67.
99. See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
100. See supra note 52 and accompanying text. For Williston's approach, see supra
notes 70-71 and accompanying text.
101. See Second Restatement, supra note 2, § 213 comment c.
102. Id § 216(2)(a). See supra note 58.
103. Second Restatement, supra note 2, § 216(2)(b). Professor Murray states that the
first and second criteria are examples of the third. See Murray, supra note 21, at 1366-67.
104. See Second Restatement, supra note 2, § 216(2)(b) ("An agreement is not com-
pletely integrated if the writing omits a consistent additional agreed term which is...
such a term as in the circumstances might naturally be omitted from the writing."). See
infra notes 106-07 and accompanying text.
105. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
106. Second Restatement, supra note 2, § 216 comment d.
107. See id. § 216 reporter's note ("fis Section carries forward the substance of for-
mer § 240(1), revised ... to make clear that oral terms which are not "natural" are




ance is natural to include in the writing °10 but the unwritten term is
nevertheless operative unless the court makes an affirmative finding that
the parties intended a fully integrated agreement. 109
A review of the various approaches used to decide whether an agree-
ment is fully integrated shows that only under the now discredited "four
corners" approach was it concluded that the rule of law, "reasonable
time," was integrated. The presumption of total integration, combined
with the unwillingness of courts to look beyond the writing itself to de-
termine partial integration, built an almost impenetrable barrier to ad-
mission of evidence of the offered term. The statement, commonly seen
in these cases, that parol evidence is inadmissible to contradict or vary
the legal effect of a writing, was simply another way of stating that the
agreement was fully integrated. It was a statement of the effect of the
rule's operation rather than a statement of the basis for excluding evi-
dence of the offered term. "Reading in" the rule of law was merely part
of courts' overzealous attempts to protect written contracts from supple-
mentation by additional terms. Under the "four corners" approach, it
mattered little which rationale the court gave for its decision, contradic-
tion or total integration, because the result was the same-exclusion of
the offered term.
With the liberalization of the rules used to determine partial integra-
tion and the increasing willingness of the courts to consider extrinsic evi-
dence on the matter, the concept of partial integration has gained
tremendous importance. This is, of course, especially true of the UCC
and the Second Restatement which assume partial integration, but it is
also true under the First Restatement "naturalness" test, which, though
formalistic, nevertheless distinctly liberalizes the "four corners"
approach.
With the increased importance of partial integration, however, the
concept of contradiction also gains in importance as the primary means
108. Such a term is also within the scope of the integration. See supra note 98. Illus-
tration 6 of § 216 of the Second Restatement is not to the contrary:
A and B sign a standard form of written agreement for the sale of goods, com-
plete on its face except that a blank for time and place of delivery is not filled in.
It is claimed that the writing was signed on the oral understanding that delivery
would be made within 30 days at the buyer's place of business. Under Uniform
Commercial Code §§ 2-308 and 2-309, the goods would be deliverable, unless
otherwise agreed, within a reasonable time at the seller's place of business. The
written agreement is not completely integrated, and the oral understanding is
admissible in evidence to supplement its terms.
Second Restatement, supra note 2, § 216 ill. 6. Apparently the illustration hinges on the
blank space and the use of a standardized form. See Second Restatement, supra note 2,
§ 216 comment d; see also Cargill, Inc. v. Fickbohm, 252 N.W.2d 739, 741-42 (Iowa
1977) (contract with blank space for delivery time can be supplemented by oral
agreement).
109. Professor Murray suggests that proof of the term should be admitted under a
"negative 'appearance' test. The matter is simply not mentioned in the writing and, using
the Wigmore aid, the evidence is presumably admissible because it neither contradicts,
varies, nor adds to the terms of the writing." Murray, supra note 21, at 1365.
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of excluding evidence of the offered term based on the appearance of the
writing itself. 10 Whether an agreement is fully or partially integrated is
logically irrelevant on this issue. Even a partial integration discharges
inconsistent agreements of the parties. Therefore, if a rule of law is
deemed integrated, any offered term displacing it is automatically
deemed discharged without inquiry into the parties' intent to merge all
their agreements into the writing.
As stated above, only under the discredited "four comers" approach
to partial integration was the rule of law, "reasonable time," deemed in-
tegrated. Can a rule of law ever be integrated under current legal
thought? It is possible, of course, for parties to state expressly the rule of
law in the written agreement."' But assume the writing is silent. If the
parties are aware of the rule of law, it may be possible to infer as a fact
that they adopted the rule of law as part of their agreement. Is this infer-
ence deemed part of the writing and therefore protected against contra-
diction by the parol evidence rule? Some authorities have said yes. In
other words, according to these authorities, a rule of law may be part of
the integration by implication of fact. This issue is considered below in
connection with implications of fact.
B. "Implied in Fact" Terms; Rules of Law as Implications of Fact
1. Williston and the First Restatement
In contrast to an implication of law, a term supplied by law, an impli-
cation of fact is part of the agreement of the parties because it is based on
an inference of actual assent of the parties.1 12 According to Williston
and the First Restatement, parol evidence is admissible to contradict im-
plications of law but it may not be used to contradict the implied in fact
110. The issue of contradiction of express terms is not within the scope of this Article.
Suffice it to note that the issue is one of the most difficult under the parol evidence rule
and has not received uniform treatment. See Wallach, supra note 41, at 669-76.
111. See Bloor v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 454 F. Supp. 258, 260 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (ex-
clusive distributor expressly covenanted to use best efforts), aff'd, 601 F.2d 609 (2d Cir.
1979); Jenkins v. Lykes, 19 Fla. 148, 150 (1882) (purchaser given reasonable time to cut
and remove timber).
112. That the area of implications of fact is a murky one, to say the least, is evidenced
by the error in the First Restatement comment on the issue that gives it a meaning con-
tradictory to that intended and that apparently has gone unnoticed for over 50 years:
Even where the extrinsic agreement is not in terms contradictory of the integra-
tion, there may be a clear implication of fact from the writing that it fully ex-
presses the whole bargain in regard to the matter in question. To contradict
such an implication of fact by extrinsic evidence is no more permissible than to
contradict the direct words of the writing. In either case the writing is inconsis-
tent with the oral agreement An implication, however, that is not [sic] based
on an inference of actual manifestation of assent must be distinguished from an
implication made by the law to fill a gap in what has been expressed.
First Restatement, supra note 11, § 240 comment c (emphasis added). Compare the
above comment with 4 S. Williston, supra note 9, § 640, at 1051-52 ("[A] distinction
must be noted between an implication based upon an inference of actual manifestation of
assent and an implication made by the law to fill a gap in what has been expressed.').
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terms of the writing. 13 Williston specifically addresses the possibility
that an implication of law might be part of the integration by implication
of fact. The implication of law is part of the integration if it can be in-
ferred from the writing that the parties (1) were aware of the rule of law,
(2) contracted with reference to it and (3) adopted it as part of their
agreement.' 1
4
Recognizing that making the distinction between rules of law that be-
come part of the writing and those that do not may be difficult, 115 the
First Restatement gives, as an example of the latter, a rule of law
designed to fill gaps in the parties' agreement,1 16 and as an example of the
former, the following: "When a promissory note, and even more clearly
a check, states no date of payment, the implication that the instrument is
payable on demand is doubtless the only reasonable inference."' 17
Although most adults know the rule of law that a check with the date left
blank is payable on demand, 1 why does the First Restatement infer
from the writing that the parties adopted the rule as part of their agree-
ment? Presumably, when it is clear that the parties are aware of the rule
of law it can be inferred that they adopted it as part of their agreement
unless they manifest an intention to exclude it. But this inference cannot
be drawn when the parties have reached an agreement to the contrary.
If, for example, the parties orally agreed to postpone payment of the
check for three months and that oral agreement is taken into account,
113. See 4 S. Williston, supra note 9, § 640, at 1051-52; see also First Restatement,
supra note 11, § 240 comment c (Implications of fact, those "based on an inference of
actual manifestation of assent" are integrated and may not be contradicted. "To contra-
dict such an implication of fact. . . is no more permissible than to contradict the direct
words of the writing.").
114. See 4 S. Williston, supra note 9, § 615, at 605.
115. See First Restatement, supra note 11, § 240 comment c ("shadings are almost
imperceptible").
116. See id; see also 4 S. Williston, supra note 9, § 640, at 1058-60.
117. First Restatement, supra note 11, § 240 comment c.
Williston's treatise was less definitive on the point. See 4 S. Williston, supra note 9,
§ 640, at 1058 ('The parties to a negotiable note or a check which does not specify a time
of payment probably understand and recognize that the writing is equivalent to a promise
to pay on demand. . . .") (emphasis added); see also Unsinn v. Wilson, 285 F.2d 273,
275 (D.C. Cir. 1960) (where note stated no maturity date, parol evidence of agreed ma-
turity date inadmissible because Negotiable Instruments Law completes instrument).
As a further example, Williston mentions the obligation implied from a blank indorse-
ment of a negotiable instrument. See 4 S. Williston, supra note 9, § 640, at 1058 ("The
legal implication from a blank indorsement also is perfectly understood by the parties,
and the implication may well be given the same effect as if the indorsement were filled out
. ... "); see also Johnson Hardware Co. v. Kempf, 188 Minn. 109, 110, 246 N.W. 663,
663 (1933) (parol evidence inadmissible to qualify unqualified indorsement). But see Al-
ban Tractor Co. v. Harrison, 228 Md. 632, 636, 180 A.2d 862, 864 (1962) (evidence of
oral agreement that indorser would not be responsible for payment admissible in suit by
payee against indorser).
The Reporter of the Second Restatement suggested more examples: The drawer's obli-
gation to make the check good and his right to stop payment if he does not receive the
merchandise. 1971 ALI Proceedings, supra note 11, at 456.
118. See U.C.C. § 3-108 (1978).
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then there is no implication of fact that the parties intended that the
instrument be paid on demand. In other words, because the parties are
aware of the rule of law, they are aware of the need to "contract out" if
they do not wish the rule to apply to their agreement. Why should they
also be aware that they must "contract out" in writing on the check?119
Williston criticized courts that purported to exclude evidence of the
offered term, "three months for repairs," because it contradicted "rea-
sonable time," a term that the law would imply only absent agreement to
the contrary. 1 ° These courts were obviously reasoning in a circle. But it
is no less circular to state that evidence of the term, "wait three months
to cash the check," is excluded because it contradicts "payable on de-
mand"-an inference that only a non-party reader of the check would
draw about the intent of the parties. Yet Williston criticized the circular
reasoning in the former case but not the latter.
Williston's underlying assumption may be that parties who agree to
postpone payment on a check ordinarily postdate the check; they do not
leave the date blank and make a separate oral agreement on the matter.
In other words, an oral agreement postponing payment is not "such an
agreement as might naturally be made as a separate agreement by parties
situated as were the parties to the written contract." '21 Williston's impli-
cation of fact that the parties adopted the rule of law as part of their
agreement would seem to be, therefore, another application of his "natu-
ralness" test."m If so, Williston perpetuates the confusion created under
the "four comers" view when the courts did not make clear whether
proof of a term was excluded because of contradiction or because of total
integration."z Just as "reasonable time" should not be "read into" the
contract when the parties have agreed to the contrary, "payable on de-
mand" should not be "read in" when the parties have agreed to the con-
trary. In both cases excluding evidence of the offered term "three
months" is based on the use of a formalistic test of total integration
rather than on contradiction of the integration.
2. Corbin
Corbin views implications of fact as a matter of interpretation of the
119. Awareness of the parol evidence rule, not awareness of the rule of law, could lead
the parties to put their agreement in writing. 'he average layman... is probably
unaware of the [parol evidence] rule's existence." Is it Necessary?, supra note 7, at 983-84.
If the parties are businessmen or are represented by counsel, it is more likely that their
agreement was fully integrated. See Childres & Spitz, Status in the Law of Contracts, 47
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1, 7-8 (1972); Sweet, supra note 7, at 1065-66. That question need not be
considered at all if the term is deemed inconsistent.
120. See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text. "T]he contradiction is one ficti-
tiously invented by the law when an ordinary contract does not state the time for per-
formance, and the parties orally agree on a particular time." 4 S. Williston, supra note 9,
§ 640, at 1058-60.
121. 4 S. Williston, supra note 9, § 638, at 1041.
122. See supra notes 56-61 and accompanying text.
123. See supra notes 35-52 and accompanying text.
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writing. 124 Parol evidence is always admissible to help define the mean-
ing of the parties' language.1 25 For example, the express terms of the
writing, as interpreted, may show that a particular time for performance
was agreed to. If so, the writing is not in fact silent. Furthermore, just as
parol evidence may be introduced to show that the written contract as
interpreted does cover the term, parol evidence would also be relevant to
show that the writing is silent. Suppose, for example, that an actor is
hired, as evidenced by a letter agreement, to perform in a play. Duration
is not stated in the writing but the parties had orally agreed that the
commitment was for three months. Without knowledge of the oral un-
derstanding, it could be inferred from the writing that the parties in-
tended the hiring to be for the run of the play.1 26 Parol evidence would
be admissible to help determine the meaning of the parties' agreement.
The fact that the parties orally agreed that the duration of employment is
three months is relevant to show that the writing was not intended to
cover the term of duration. Because the writing, by a process of interpre-
tation, is shown to be silent on the term of duration of the employment,
the agreed duration is operative as a consistent additional term. Corbin
would conclude that the writing is at most a partial integration.
In the First Restatement's check example, the inference that the par-
ties adopted the rule of law "payable on demand" is based on an infer-
ence of the parties' intent derived from their written agreement 127 and
therefore is a question of interpretation. Under Corbin's view, the parol
evidence rule would not bar evidence of the actual agreement to show
that the check was not intended to cover the term of payment date to
negate the implication of fact that the check is payable on demand.128
124. See 3 A. Corbin, supra note 7, § 579, at 412-31; id. § 593, at 559-60 & n.91; see
also ide § 593, at 556 ("[P]resumptions of law or fact, or the inferences by which the court
fills gaps in a contract that is in all other respects in writing, do not themselves constitute
any part of the 'integration' that is supposed to be protected against variance or contra-
diction by the 'parol evidence rule.' ") (emphasis added).
For a case that avoided the parol evidence rule issue of whether the right to sue for
breach of contract is part of the integration by taking an interpretation approach, see
Delta Dynamics, Inc. v. Arioto, 69 Cal. 2d 525, 527-29, 446 P.2d 785, 786-87, 72 Cal.
Rptr. 785, 786-87 (1968) (en bane) (extrinsic evidence considered to determine whether
contractual provision providing for termination in case of failure to meet minimum quota
was exclusive remedy for breach).
125. 3 A. Corbin, supra note 7, § 543, at 133-34; Calamari & Perillo, supra note 15, at
352.
126. The assumption of the text is that the inference can be made from the writing
itself. In many cases such inferences have been based on trade practices. See Pflester v.
Western Union Tel. Co., 282 Il. 69, 75, 118 N.E. 407, 409 (1917) (custom of contracting
with baseball players for the duration of the baseball season); Wilson v. Hitchcock, 174
N.Y.S. 673, 674 (Sup. Ct. 1919) (custom in theater business of giving actors two weeks
notice of termination).
127. See supra notes 117-18 and accompanying text.
128. See 3 A. Corbin, supra note 7, § 587, at 293 n.42 (1971 Supp.).
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3. Second Restatement
The Second Restatement adopts Corbin's position that all relevant evi-
dence including parol evidence is admissible on the issue of interpreta-
tion.129 It also adopts Corbin's view that even if a term is one that would
naturally be included in the writing, evidence of it is barred only if the
term contradicts the writing or the writing is fully integrated.' 3" Never-
theless, the Second Restatement continues the First Restatement ap-
proach on implications of fact. It provides the following illustration,
obviously derived from the First Restatement's check example:
131
A check states no date of payment, but it is orally agreed that the
check will be paid only after six months. The oral agreement contra-
dicts the check. Under Uniform Commercial Code § 3-108 the check
is payable on demand, and most competent adults in the United States
have reason to know the rule.
132
The illustration states as a fact that the parties have agreed to postpone
payment of the check for six months. Therefore, the inference drawn by
the illustration-that because the parties are aware of the rule of law,
they have adopted it as part of their agreement---can only be based on an
interpretation of the intent of the parties based on the writing alone, out
of the context of the parties' actual agreement. Yet the Second Restate-
ment emphasizes that "[t]he determination whether an alleged additional
term is consistent or inconsistent with the integrated agreement requires
interpretation of the writing in the light of all the circumstances, includ-
ing the evidence of the additional term.' 33 The inference that the parties
contracted with reference to the rule of law and adopted it as part of
their agreement would be negated by interpreting the writing in light of
the "additional term." Setting up an implication of fact as an absolute
barrier to admitting evidence of the actual agreement of the parties is
clearly out of step with the Second Restatement's position on
interpretation.
134
129. See Second Restatement, supra note 2, § 212 comment b ("Any determination of
meaning or ambiguity should only be made in light of the relevant evidence of the situa-
tion and relations of the parties, the subject matter of the transaction, preliminary negoti-
ations and statements made therein, usages of trade, and the course of dealing between
the parties."). See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
130. See Second Restatement, supra note 2, § 216 comment d. See supra note 87-89
and accompanying text.
131. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
132. Second Restatement, supra note 2, § 216 ill. 1.
133. Id § 216 comment b (emphasis added).
134. The topic of "private codes," a topic on the borderline of integration and interpre-
tation, is illustrative of the Second Restatementes position on interpretation. See Second
Restatement, supra note 2, § 212 Wl. 3-4. Can a party to an apparently complete written
agreement introduce evidence of a prior agreement to use the word "buy" to mean "sell"?
The original Restatement said no. See First Restatement, supra note 11, § 231 ill 2.
Corbin disagreed, stating that it is impossible to know whether an extrinsic term contra-
dicts an integrated agreement until that agreement is interpreted. See 3 A. Corbin, supra
note 7, § 543, at 130-31; Calamari & Perillo, supra note 15, at 352. The Second Restate-
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Such a barrier is also out of step with the Second Restatement's provi-
sions on partial integration. 3 ' While the First Restatement position on
implications of fact is consistent with its assumption that an apparently
complete written contract ordinarily represents a fully integrated agree-
ment, 13 6 the Second Restatement rejects this assumption. 137 Logically,
any approach which rejects the traditional assumption of total integra-
tion should also conclude that implications of fact are not part of the
integration. 131 The question of whether an agreement is totally or par-
tially integrated should be asked and resolved before deciding whether an
alleged extrinsic term is inconsistent with the implied in fact terms of a
writing. 139
Arguably, the First Restatement's provisions on implications of fact
are consistent with its "naturalness" test."4 If the parties are unaware of
ment adopts the Corbin position on private codes, so that evidence of the prior agreement
that the word "buy" is used to mean "sell" is admissible. See Second Restatement, supra
note 2, § 212 ill. 4; id. § 212 comment c. The net effect of this position is: 1) an additional
agreement not contained in the writing (the private code) is operative and 2) this addi-
tional agreement contradicts the meaning that would be given the instrument by one
unacquainted with the private code. The Second Restatement justifies the admission of
evidence of the private code because the extrinsic agreement does not relate to perform-
ance under the contract but only to the meaning of its language. See Second Restate-
ment, supra note 2, § 212 comment b, reporter's note (citing 3 A. Corbin, supra note 7,
§ 540, at 93-94, where Corbin makes this distinction). The Second Restatement's posi-
tion on private codes, see Second Restatement, supra note 2, § 212 ill. 3-4, seems to indi-
cate that the meaning of the writing has no life of its own apart from the expressed intent
of the parties. But the Second Restatement position on implications of fact contradicts
this approach. See supra notes 131-33 and accompanying text.
135. See Second Restatement, supra note 2, § 216 comment b.
136. See First Restatement, supra note 11, § 240(1)(b) comment d; see also 4 S. Willis-
ton, supra note 9, § 633, at 1014-15.
137. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
138. The UCC parol evidence rule, U.C.C. § 2-202 (1978), also rejects the assumption
mentioned in the text. See supra note 78 and accompanying text. The initial paragraph
of § 2-202 describes what in Second Restatement terminology is an integrated agreement,
see Second Restatement, supra note 2, § 209(1), and states the rule that an integrated
agreement may not be contradicted, see U.C.C. § 2-202 (1978). The thrust of the para-
graph is clearly directed to express terms of the writing: "Terms with respect to which
the confirmatory memoranda of the parties agree or which are otherwise set forth In a
writing intended by the parties as a final expression of their agreement with respect to
such terms as are included therein may not be contradicted. . . ." U.C.C § 2-202 (1978)
(emphasis added). In contrast, UCC § 2-202(b), which describes what the Second Re-
statement would call a fully integrated agreement, see Second Restatement, supra note 2,
§ 210(1), clearly refers to the entire agreement (including express and implied in fact
terms). See American Law Institute, 1956 Recommendations of the Editorial Board for
the Uniform Commercial Code 26; Broude, supra note 14, at 886-88; see also U.C.C. § 1-
201(3) (1978) (defining "agreement"). See infra note 197 and accompanying text.
139. The Second Restatement states that the issue of total or partial integration is to be
decided before the question of interpretation or application of the parol evidence rule.
See Second Restatement, supra note 2, § 210(3). However, the provisions on partial inte-
gration apply only to a consistent additional term. See id. § 216 comment a. Illustration
I to § 216, see supra text accompanying note 132, indicates that the offered term is inop-
erative because it contradicts the implication of fact (payment on demand) without in-
quiry as to whether the agreement (on the instrument) is totally or partially integrated.
140. See First Restatement, supra note 11, § 240(1)(b).
PAR OL EVIDENCE AND IMPLIED TERMS
the rule of law, it is not necessarily natural to include in the writing a
term that has the effect of changing the rule of law. On the other hand, if
the parties are aware of the rule of law, it may be natural to include the
contrary agreement in writing. The Second Restatement, however, has
eliminated use of the "naturalness" test to exclude evidence of consistent
additional terms.14' If this test is not conclusive on the issue of intent to
merge all agreements into the writing, why should it be conclusive on the
issue of consistency? By continuing the First Restatement provision on
implications of fact, the Second Restatement has perpetuated a relic.
It has been forcefully argued elsewhere that proof of terms contra-
dicting even the express terms of a writing should not be automatically
excluded by the parol evidence rule.'42 Even in the absence of invalidat-
ing cause such as fraud or mistake,1 43 an oral agreement contradicting
the writing could show that the writing was not assented to as a final
expression of the agreement."4 With the increased confidence in the reli-
141. See supra notes 104-09 and accompanying text.
Surprisingly, the remarks of the Reporter of the Second Restatement suggest that he
incorrectly believed that the Second Restatement's "naturalness" test is both a test of
admission and a test of exclusion as it was under the First Restatement:
[C]arrying forward the principle that was in the original Restatement... is the
piece in [Section 216(2)(b)] which says that you can show as a side agreement
. . . something which in the circumstances might naturally be omitted from the
writing. [Professor Corbin] asserts in his treatise, that [it] was Professor Willis-
ton's contribution to the law, there is some support in the cases for it, of course,
but there is no rule of law, said Professor Corbin, or if there is there ought not
to be, that requires people to do things which are natural to other people.
Well, I think with all deference that he is wrong about that, that if you do
things in the usual way, it is not surprising that you were thought to have the
usual meaning, and to have made the contract that would usually be made in
the situation.
Now, what is natural gets very troublesome. One of the leading cases in the
New York Court of Appeals [Mitchill v. Lath, 247 N.Y. 377, 160 N.E. 646
(1928)-they divide four to three on whether it was natural or not---sold a
piece of farm real estate, residence and farm, with an elaborate written purchase
and sale agreement and a side oral agreement that as part of the deal the un-
sightly icehouse across the street would be torn down.
Now, that was oral, the icehouse agreement. And the trial judge had gone
through and made findings that there was such an agreement, it was very clear.
Four to three the Court of Appeals said this was too long an agreement to have
an oral side agreement like that, and it was superseded by the written agreement
and could not be given effect. . . .
Well, the three dissenting judges accepted the principle, but they thought it
was quite natural to omit this one.
So I don't know that I have taken sides between the four judges and the three
by the formulation here. It is substantially the formulation that was in the origi-
nal Restatement.
1971 ALI Proceedings, supra note 11, at 454-55. Compare the Reporter's remarks with
Second Restatement, supra note 2, § 216 comment d, which clearly adopts the Corbin
approach.
142. McLauchlan, The Inconsistent Collateral Contract, 3 Dalhousie L.J. 136, 162
(1976).
143. Second Restatement, supra note 2, § 214(d).
144. See Lakeside Bridge & Steel Co. v. Mountain State Constr. Co., 400 F. Supp. 273,
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ability of oral testimony and the concomitant decreased belief in the
sanctity of written contracts, 145 the arguments in favor of protecting
writings against direct contradiction weaken. When the express terms of
the writing are silent on the term in question, those arguments should
virtually disappear. Wigmore contended that the question of consistency
cannot be asked to determine admissibility of an offered term, for if con-
sistency were the test, no offered term would be admitted.1 46 His argu-
ment is particularly apt when it is claimed that the offered term
contradicts a term on which the writing is silent.
The example of the check was used in the above discussion because it
is the example that was used by Williston and both Restatements. But
these authorities do not limit their reasoning to that context. 147 Thus,
their reasoning could extend to a tremendous range of potential implica-
tions of fact. Parties in a particular trade are assumed to contract with
reference to various practices in the trade.14 8  When the parties are
clearly aware of those practices, the Restatements' view would seem to be
that the practices are part of the parties' written contract by implication
of fact.14 9 Thus, an oral agreement that changes the implication of fact
would be barred as inconsistent even though the writing is only a partial
integration. 50 Scholars have long debated whether certain "implied
terms" are implications of law or implications of fact.1" Why should
278 (E.D. Wis. 1975); 3 A. Corbin, supra note 7, § 583, at 469-70; Comment, Contracts--
Warranties, Unconscionability, and the Parol Evidence Rule-Industraease Automated &
Scientific Corp. v. R.M.E. Enters., Inc., 27 Buffalo L. Rev. 521, 532 (1978). For an
analysis of judicial treatment of inconsistencies with express terms, see Wallach, supra
note 41, at 669-70.
145. See generally E. Farnsworth, supra note 25, § 7.2, at 449 (1982) (courts increas-
ingly receptive to oral testimony because faith in written statements has declined); Wal-
lach, supra note 41 (same).
146. See 9 J. Wigmore, supra note 9, § 2431, at 102 (questions of whether offered terms
,'vary,' or 'contradict,' or are 'inconsistent,' involve the same futility").
147. In the context of a negotiable instrument, the result may be justified if one consid-
ers third parties. Negotiable instruments involve particularized policy considerations,
e.g., the need for certainty and the ability to rely on a written unconditional promise. See
Jordan, "Just Sign Here-Its only a Formality": Parol Evidence in the Law of Commer-
cial Paper, 13 Ga. L. Rev. 53, 55-57 (1978).
148. See U.C.C. § 2-202 official comment (1978); First Restatement, supra note 11,
§ 246 comment c; Second Restatement, supra note 2, §§ 222-23. On whether proof of the
trade usage to supplement the written agreement can itself be barred by the parol evi-
dence rule, see Nanakuli Paving and Rock Co. v. Shell Oil Co., 664 F.2d 772, 796-805
(9th Cir. 1981); First Restatement, supra note 11, § 246 comments b-c; Second Restate-
ment, supra note 2, § 220 comment c; 9 J. Wigmore, supra note 9, § 2440, at 131; Kirst,
Usage of Trade and Course of Dealing: Subversion of the UCC Theory, 1977 U. Ill. L.F.
811, 832-36.
149. See Second Restatement, supra note 2, § 222.
150. See supra notes 112-14 and accompanying text.
151. Compare Kuntz, Professor Merrill's Contribution to Oil and Gas Law, 25 Okla. L.
Rev. 484, 485 (1972) (covenants in mineral leases implied in law) with R. Hemingway,
The Law of Oil and Gas § 8.1, at 413 (2d ed. 1983) (implied in fact is majority view) and
Walker, The Nature of Property Interests Created by an Oil and Gas Lease in Texas, 11
Tex. L. Rev. 399, 402-08 (1933) (implied in fact). See Salim, Implied Covenants Between
Assignors and Assignees of Oil and Gas Leases: Policy and Precedent, 31 Sw. L.J. 905, 912
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substantive rights depend on subtleties that noted scholars are incapable
of resolving? Even if such terms are implications of law, when does it
become obvious to a court that an implication of law has become so well
known that the parties are deemed to adopt it as part of their
agreement?1
52
As both Restatements recognize, the distinction between rules of law
designed to fill gaps and rules of law adopted by the parties by implica-
tion of fact may involve "almost imperceptible shadings." '53 When an
almost imperceptible shading results in constructing the fiction that the
parties contracted with reference to a rule of law even though there is
credible evidence that they did not, the law has not progressed far be-
yond the state of "primitive formalism."' 54
Under modem approaches to partial integration and interpretation, it
should never be appropriate to exclude automatically as contradictory,
evidence of a term as to which the writing is silent. Proof of the offered
term should not be barred unless the parties intended to discharge the
offered agreement. In other words, the issue of whether an agreement is
totally or partially integrated should be addressed before automatically
(1977) (discussing whether implied covenants in mineral leases are implied in fact or
law); Comment, The Amoco Case: The Implied Covenant to Seek Favorable Administra-
tive Action, 14 Tex. Tech L. Rev. 459, 464-66 (1983) (same). For consideration of the
issue in the context of an obligation to perform a contract in good faith, see More on Goad
Faith, supra note 2, at 497, 498-504. Was the implied promise by the exclusive agent to
use best efforts to promote defendant's designs in Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 222
N.Y. 88, 118 N.E. 214 (1917), implied in law or in fact? Compare Broude, supra note 14,
at 887-88 (implied in fact) with Mandel v. Liebman, 303 N.Y. 88, 94, 100 N.E.2d 149,
152-53 (1951) (implied in law, but apparently based on the rule that interpretation of a
writing is a matter of law) and U.C.C. § 2-306(2) (1978) (obligation imposed by statute
unless otherwise agreed).
For an example of a case that did not treat an implied best efforts obligation as an
implication of fact for parol evidence rule purposes, see Garden Park Homes Corp. v.
Martin Marietta Corp., 507 S.W.2d 368 (Mo. 1974) (per curiam). In that case, a mineral
lease provided for extraction of sand for twelve years at a royalty of twelve cents per ton,
from the terms of the writing alone, there would have been an implied covenant to use
reasonable diligence in extracting sand. Id at 374. Nevertheless, the court held that the
trial court should have admitted evidence that the parties had orally agreed on a yearly
minimum royalty of $15,000 even though the oral agreement had the effect of negating
the implied term. See id at 373. See infra notes 239-40.
152. See Walker, supra note 151, at 406 (even if originally implication of law, "[t]he
implied covenants, at least in their broad outlines, have become so well established and
so widely recognized that it may fairly be said that the parties usually contract with them
in mind"); see also 1970 ALI Proceedings, supra note 6, at 481 ('Which came first? Was
it the law that made the meaning that people normally have, or was it the meaning that
people normally have that led to the rule of law?").
153. First Restatement, supra note 11, § 240 comment c; Second Restatement, supra
note 2, § 216 comment b.
154. See Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 222 N.Y. 88, 91, 118 N.E. 214,214 (1917)
('The law has outgrown its primitive stage of formalism. . . ."); Metzger, supra note 41,
at 1386 (parol evidence rule traced to "a primitive formalism which attached mystical
and ceremonial effectiveness to the carta and the seal.") (quoting C McCormick, Hand-
book of the Law of Evidence § 211, at 430 n.4 (1954)).
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excluding evidence of additional terms on the ground of inconsistency
with the "implied" terms of the writing.
II. DOES THE PAROL EVIDENCE RULE APPLY TO OBLIGATIONS
IMPOSED BY LAw?
Although the parol evidence rule can exclude extrinsic evidence to
prove agreements made prior to or contemporaneously with a writing to
which the parties have assented,155 authorities agree that the parol evi-
dence rule does not exclude obligations imposed by law.156 Even though
the court's implication of a term has the effect of adding to the parties'
obligations under a written contract, the parol evidence rule is not an
objection. Otherwise all applicable rules of law would have to be spelled
out in the writing or risk exclusion by the rule. Obviously, no policy
served by the parol evidence rule is advanced by reducing the power of
the court to govern the contractual relation of the parties.
Nevertheless, when the parties have reduced the terms of their agree-
ment to writing, the courts seem to apply the same criteria to the impli-
cation of a term as they do to the admissibility of an oral agreement of
the parties. 57 The mere existence of the written agreement,158 its appar-
155. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
156. See Tyus v. Resta, 328 Pa. Super. 11, 25, 476 A.2d 427, 434 (1984) (implied
warranty of habitablity not excluded by integration clause because parol evidence rule
does not apply to obligation imposed by law); see also 3 A. Corbin, supra note 7, § 593, at
563; 4 S. Williston, supra note 9, § 643, at 1084. The UCC parol evidence rule, U.C.C.§ 2-202 (1978), is in accord. See Duckworth v. Ford Motor Co., 211 F. Supp. 888, 891(E.D. Pa. 1962) (implied warranty of merchantability not excluded by written contract
that purported to state the entire agreement of the parties), affid in part, rev'd in part on
other grounds, 320 F.2d 130 (3d Cir. 1963); Appeals of Reeves Soundcraft Corp., 2
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 210, 219 (A.S.B.C.A. 1964) (parol evidence admissible to
establish implied warranty though written agreement fully integrated); Moye, Exclusion
and Modification of Warranty under the U. C. C-How to Succeed in Business Without
Being Liable for Not Really Trying, 46 Den. L.J. 579, 606 & n.161 (1969) ("Since implied
warranties are generally viewed as arising by operation of law, rather than by conduct of
the parties, the parol evidence rule is irrelevant to implied warranties."); Note, Warran-
ties, Disclaimers and the Parol Evidence Rule, 53 Colum. L. Rev. 858, 864 & n.47 (1953)(warranties imposed by law are outside operation of parol evidence rule) [hereinafter
cited as Parol Warranties]. The UCC parol evidence rule applies to "terms," defined in
UCC § 1-201(42), and "agreements," defined in UCC § 1-201(3). See U.C.C. § 2-202
(1978). Neither includes obligations imposed by law. Compare these with the definition
of "contract," U.C.C. § 1-201(11). The UCC rules are discussed more fully in connec-
tion with implied warranties. See infra notes 184-85, 192-215 and accompanying text.
For a case that gives undue dignity to a parol evidence argument against implication of
a term, see William Berland Realty Co. v. Hahne & Co., 26 N.J. Super. 477, 485-87, 98
A.2d 124, 128-29 (1953), modified per curiam on other grounds, 29 N.J. Super. 316, 102
A.2d 686 (1954). The court countered the parol evidence objection by characterizing the
implication as one of fact derived from the writing itself, and stated that although the
parol evidence rule "prohibits the modification of a written agreement" by oral evidence,
an implied covenant may be recognized as an "articulation of a provision implicit in the
agreement and as much a part thereof as if it had been expressly stated." Id at 485, 98
A.2d at 128.
157. See Fashion Fabrics, Inc. v. Retail Investors Corp., 266 N.W.2d 22, 28 (Iowa
1978) (covenant will not be implied where contract is fully integrated). This practice is
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ent completeness and detail,159 its execution after extensive negotiations
conducted with aid of counsel,1" and the presence of a merger clause, 6"
all have been used as reasons for refusing to imply an obligation. But on
what basis?
A. Silence of Writing as Inference of Intent
to Exclude the Implication
Courts commonly apply a rule stating that a court will not imply a
term that is dealt with in the writing or on which the written agreement
is "intentionally silent." 62 Of course, if the writing conflicts with a term
the court would imply, the writing itself evidences intent to exclude the
highlighted by Gerard v. Almouli, 746 F.2d 936 (2d Cir. 1984) which involved both the
argument that the court should imply an obligation to use "best efforts" and the offer of
parol evidence to prove that the parties had actually agreed to such an obligation. See Id.
at 939. On the implied obligation, the court noted that the implication will not be made
where parties "otherwise agreed." See id. Because the written contract set out specific
obligations, the court concluded that the parties had "otherwise agreed" and therefore it
would be "improper to read into the contract a contradictory sales requirement." Id.
The court went on to hold that the "parol evidence argument falls by virtue of the same
finding." Id. The dissent concluded that the written contract was silent as to the "best
efforts" obligation, and therefore the court should have admitted parol evidence to deter-
mine whether the obligation should be imposed. See id. at 941 (Van Graafeland, J.,
dissenting).
158. See Conservative Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Warnecke, 324 S.W.2d 471,478 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1959) ("[W]hen parties reduce their agreements to writing it is presumed that
the instrument contains their entire contract, and the court will not read into it additional
provisions unless this be necessary to effectuate the intention of the parties as disclosed by
the contract as a whole."). When the parties' agreement is oral or evidenced by informal
writings courts feel free to consult all evidence of the circumstances surrounding the
transaction to determine the parties' obligations. See 3 A. Corbin, supra note 7, § 522, at
2-3; E. Farnsworth, supra note 25, § 7.10, at 492-93.
159. See Goff v. Jacobs, 164 Miss. 817, 825, 145 So. 728, 729 (1933) (Courts are "re-
luctant" to imply a term "particularly... where, as here, the parties have at much pains
and in detail undertaken to reduce their agreement to such specific written terms as to
evince their purpose to expressly cover every phase of their understanding.'.
160. See HML Corp. v. General Foods Corp., 365 F.2d 77, 81 (3d Cir. 1966)
("[W]here the bargain is the result of elaborate negotiations in which the parties are aided
by counsel... it is easier to assume that a failure to make provision in the agreement
resulted not from ignorance of the problem, but from an agreement not to require it.").
161. See Vacuum Concrete Corp. of Am. v. American Mach. & Foundry Co., 321 F.
Supp. 771, 774 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) ("[Ihe merger or integration clause.. . negates the
thought that they intended to impose. . . a duty upon AMF' not contained in the con-
tract.); Detroit Trust Co. v. Engel, 192 Mich. 62, 64, 158 N.W. 123, 124 (1916) (merger
clause excluded implied warranty). But see Havel v. Kelsey-Hayes Co., 83 A.D.2d 380,
384, 445 N.Y.S.2d 333, 336 (1981) (court properly held that the merger clause did not
prevent implication of a promise to exercise reasonable diligence, but went on to make
the overbroad statement that the purpose of the merger clause is "to preclude considera-
tion of matters extrinsic to the agreement"). A merger clause does not bar consideration
of extrinsic evidence for all purposes. See infra notes 216-29 and accompanying text. For
consideration of the issue in the context of the implied warranty of fitness for a particular
purpose, see infra notes 216-30 and accompanying text.
162. See, eg., So Good Potato Chip Co. v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 462 F.2d 239, 241 (8th Cir.
1972); Foley v. Euless, 214 Cal. 506, 511, 6 P.2d 956, 958 (1931) (per curiam); Glass v.
Mancuso, 444 S.W.2d 467, 478 (Mo. 1969).
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term.163 But assume that the writing is silent on the obligation in ques-
tion. How does a court decide that a written agreement is "intentionally
silent?" If the existence of an apparently complete written contract
raises an inference of exclusion, then it is as though the court is applying
the principles underlying the parol evidence rule to the implication of a
term.
A court might suspect that a party is urging the court to imply a term
that the party was unable to obtain through negotiation. 164 The parties
might have discussed the term during negotiations and either never
agreed on it or agreed tentatively but later excluded the term in their
final agreement.1 6 If such discussions actually took place, they may or
may not be admissible. 166 But if no such evidence is introduced and ad-
mitted, there is no reason to infer exclusion from the writing's silence. It
is obviously unrealistic to assume that the parties had all possible obliga-
tions in mind when the writing was executed.16 7 At most, silence evi-
dences absence of intent on the issue.
Absence of intent is relevant to an implication of fact but not to an
implication of law. Because an implication of fact is based on an infer-
ence of intention, the silence of an apparently complete writing could
conclusively indicate absence of the requisite intent. But the court's abil-
ity to impose the same obligation as an implication of law remains unaf-
fected. The parties' silence indicates absence of intent, not intent to
exclude the term.
163. See So Good Potato Chip Co. v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 462 F.2d 239, 241 (8th Cir.
1972) (negative covenant by Frito-Lay not to sell competing products in the franchise
territory not implied where a "paragraph ... of the. . . franchise agreement expressly
deals with the sale of products by Frito-Lay in the franchised territory."); see also Goetz
& Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice: An Analysis of the Interactions Between Express
and Implied Contract Terms, 73 Cal. L. Rev. 261, 312 (1985) (problem of distinguishing
between "supplementary expressions and trumps").
164. In Local 461, Int'l Union of Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers v. Singer Co., 540 F.
Supp. 442, 447-49 (D.N.J. 1982), plaintiff claimed a provision in the contract implied a
guarantee that Singer would keep its Elizabeth, New Jersey plant open. The court stated,
"[i]f the union had been able to wrest a guarantee of continued employment from the
company, words embodying that promise would have appeared explicitly in the agree-
ment." Id. at 448. While not finding such a guarantee, the court concluded that the
provision in question obligated Singer to use best efforts to keep the plant efficient and
that Singer had breached that obligation. Id at 449. For an example of bold judicial gap
filling, see J.C. Millett Co. v. Park & Tilford Distillers Corp., 123 F. Supp. 484 (N.D. Cal.
1954), in which plaintiff made repeated unsuccessful efforts to obtain a fixed term or
termination provisions in a liquor distributorship agreement. See id. at 488. Defendant
refused to agree to such provisions. See id. The court, stating that defendant's refusal to
give a fixed term or termination provisions nonetheless contemplated a continuing rela-
tionship, see id. at 491, held that the duration of the contract was a reasonable time (one
year) and terminable only on reasonable notice (three months). See id. at 493.
165. See Vacuum Concrete Corp. of Am. v. American Mach. & Foundry Co., 321 F.
Supp. 771, 773 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Farnsworth, supra note 6, at 873.
166. See infra notes 237-49 and accompanying text.
167. Farnsworth, supra note 6, at 869. See supra note 5.
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B. Effect of Recognition that Implication is Based on Rule of Law,
Rather than Inference of Intent
When the term to be supplied is clearly recognized as a rule of law
applying to the transaction, no inference of exclusion by silence is
made.'68 For example, a contract for the sale of goods which is silent on
the subject of warranties does not raise an inference that implied warran-
ties are excluded.'69 A contract for the sale of the assets of a business
including goodwill imposes on the seller an obligation to refrain from
direct solicitation of the seller's former customers because that conduct
would destroy the value of the goodwill, but the contract's silence on
direct solicitation raises no inference that the implied covenant is ex-
cluded. 170 When the implied term falls clearly within the duty of good
faith and fair dealing which applies to every contract, 171 silence evidences
no intentional exclusion.' Rather, an agreement excluding an obliga-
tion imposed by law must be clear and unambiguous. 17 Thus, the extent
to which the court will assume exclusion by silence will vary inversely
with the court's willingness to view the implication as a settled rule of
law which applies to the parties' agreement.
The inference of exclusion by the silence of an apparently complete
writing is rarely the primary basis for the decision not to imply the term.
Rather, the primary basis is that the legal criteria necessary for implica-
tion of a term did not exist. 74 Futhermore, when the implication of a
168. The gap filling provisions of Article 2 of the UCC, which apply absent agreement
to the contrary, clearly illustrate this approach. See U.C.C. § 2-303 to -311 (1978). Arti-
cle 2 mandates the obligation of best efforts in an exclusive dealing contract unless the
parties agree otherwise. See id. § 2-306(2). Thus, silence would not constitute an agree-
ment to the contrary.
169. See infra notes 184-85 and accompanying text.
170. See Bergum v. Weber, 136 Cal. App. 2d 389, 393, 288 P.2d 623, 625-26 (1955).
171. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
172. See Bergum v. Weber, 136 Cal. App. 2d 389, 393-94, 288 P.2d 623, 626 (1955)
('If without the implied obligation the fruits of the contract would be denied to one of the
parties, the intent that such an obligation should not exist must clearly appear from the
express terms of the contract.").
173. Bonner v. Westbound Records, Inc., 76 IM. App. 3d 736, 748, 394 N.E.2d 1303,
1311 (1979) ("The doctrine announced in Wood v. Lucy involving an implied promise of
good faith performance has become such an integral part of contract law that contractual
terms should not be construed to negate it where they are ambiguous or subject to a
contrary interpretation."); see also Stone v. Caroselli, 653 P.2d 754, 756-57 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1982) (distributor's duty under UCC § 2-306(2) to use best efforts in exclusive deal-
ing contract to promote the sale of the product not negated by a contractual provision
giving distributor the discretion to designate number and location of sales outlets); Furrer
v. International Health Assurance Co., 256 Or. 429, 438-40, 474 P.2d 759, 763-65 (1970)
(promise to use best efforts implied although contractual provision stated "plaintiff
'agrees to spend such time as he personally sees fit' in developing agency agreements and
personal sales").
174. In Conservative Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Warnecke, 324 S.W.2d 471 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1959), lessee alleged that lessor had an implied duty to notify lessee of an increase in
the average rent before the lease's escalator clause based on that figure became operative.
See id. at 477. The court reversed the trial court's holding that such a covenant should be
implied: "The escalator clause is clear and definite in its terms. It omits any reference to
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term is necessary for the very existence of a valid contract, the complete-
ness and formality of the writing which are said to militate against the
implication of a term have the opposite effect. They militate for the im-
plication of a term because the court can infer that the parties intended a
contract, not a nullity. 175
In summary, the adoption of a writing should have no effect on the
court's ability or willingness to make an implication of law despite spo-
radic statements in the decisions to the contrary. An implication of law
is made unless the parties have expressed an intent to exclude it. Whether
or not such a contrary agreement must appear in the writing itself is
discussed in Parts I and IV but it is clear, at least, that the silence of the
writing is not by itself such an expression.
III. DOES THE PAROL EVIDENCE RULE EXCLUDE EXTRINSIC
EVIDENCE NECESSARY TO ESTABLISH AN OBLIGATION
IMPOSED BY LAW?
Under the great weight of authority, the parol evidence rule does not
exclude evidence extrinsic to the writing to establish an obligation im-
posed by law. 76 The parol evidence rule is not meant to preclude all
inquiry into the circumstances surrounding a transaction.1 77 At most,
notice to the lessee of any increase in the average rental. From reading the entire clause it
is our judgment that such omission was intentional." Id. at 480.
But the same court would have implied an obligation under the same escalator clause
to notify of a decrease in average rent, upon request of the lessee, because that event
triggered the lessee's right to terminate the lease. See id. at 479-80. The court stated, "It
would seem that in a case of that kind such an implied obligation would be necessary in
order to fully protect the rights of the lessee under the lease." Id. at 480.
175. See Sylvan Crest Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 150 F.2d 642, 643 (2d Cir.
1945) ("No one can read the document as a whole without concluding that the parties
intended a contract. . . ."); Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 222 N.Y. 88, 90-91, 118
N.E. 214, 214 (1917) ("A promise may be lacking, and yet the whole writing may be
'instinct with an obligation'. . . ."); Mezzanotte v. Freeland, 20 N.C. App. 11, 17, 200
S.E.2d 410, 414 (1973) (contract not declared void for illusoriness because parties in-
tended to be bound).
176. See 3 A. Corbin, supra note 7, § 590, at 550; E. Farnsworth, supra note 25, § 7.16,
at 525; 4 S. Williston, supra note 9, § 643, at 1110.
177. For example, the parol evidence rule does not apply to interpretation of a writing.
See 3 A. Corbin, supra note 7, § 579, at 412-13; First Restatement, supra note 11, § 237
comment a; Second Restatement, supra note 2, § 213 comment a; 4 S. Williston, supra
note 9, § 631, at 955. Under the so-called "plain meaning" rule of interpretation, how-
ever, many courts still require a finding of ambiguity on the face of the document as a
prerequisite to introducing extrinsic evidence for this purpose. See, e.g., Grumman Al-
lied Indus. v. Rohr Indus., 748 F.2d 729, 734 (2d Cir. 1984); Zim v. Western Publishing
Co., 573 F.2d 1318, 1322-23 (5th Cir. 1978); Poggi v. Tool Research and Eng. Corp., 75
Wash. 2d 356, 364, 451 P.2d 296, 301 (1969). The parol evidence rule does not exclude
extrinsic evidence used to attack the validity of the agreement due to, for example, fraud,
duress, mistake, illegality or lack of consideration. See 3 A. Corbin, supra note 7, § 580,
at 431, 436-38; First Restatement, supra note 11, § 238(b); Second Restatement, supra
note 2, § 214(d); 4 S. Williston, supra note 9, § 634, at 1017-20; see also Sweet, Promissory
Fraud and the Parol Evidence Rule, 49 Calif. L. Rev. 877, 894, 896-97 (1961) (criticizing
California rule limiting parol evidence to prove promissory fraud). Nor does it apply to
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the parol evidence rule can have the effect of forcing parties to put all
their agreements relating to a particular transaction into writing at the
risk of being unable to prove those that are omitted from the writing.17
The rule does not cut off a court's ability to consider circumstances sur-
rounding a transaction which are relevant to deciding whether to impose
an obligation.
179
Sometimes extrinsic evidence is necessary to establish an obligation
imposed by law. In a percentage lease, for example, the lessee may
promise to pay the lessor a fixed sum plus a percentage of the profits.boo
In such cases, most courts have implied a promise on the part of the
lessee to use best efforts to produce profits if the fixed sum is nominal, but
not if it is substantial." 1 Some courts will imply a promise even where
the fixed sum is more than nominal, provided it is significantly below the
proof of an oral condition precedent to the effectiveness of a written agreement. See Pym
v. Campbell, 6 Ellis & Bl. 370, 374, 119 Eng. Rep. 903, 905 (Q.B. 1856); 3 A. Corbin,
supra note 7, § 589, at 530-32; First Restatement, supra note 11, § 241; Second Restate-
ment, supra note 2, § 217; 4 S. Wtlliston, supra note 9, § 634, at 1021-26. But see Wal-
lach, supra note 41, at 654 ("This exception to the parol evidence rule is difficult to
justify."). It does not prevent reformation of the instrument. See First Restatement,
supra note 11, § 238(c); Second Restatement, supra note 2, § 214(e); Palmer, supra note
14, at 833. The "common law exceptions" to the parol evidence rule are available under
the Uniform Commercial Code. See J. White & R. Summers, supra note 78, § 2-11, at
88-89; Broude, supra note 14, at 890-902.
178. For a comparison of the parol evidence rule and the statute of frauds, see 3 A.
Corbin, supra note 7, § 575, at 380-82.
179. If the implication is one of fact, but not from the writing alone, the parol evidence
rule may bar evidence to prove it. See supra notes 24 and 148. Thus the parol evidence
rule could bar evidence of words or conduct to add terms to a fully integrated agreement.
The need to decide whether extrinsic evidence is being used to prove an implied in fact or
implied in law term is avoided by courts that take an expansive interpretation approach.
Evidence of the circumstances of the transaction, including statements made, are then
considered in interpreting the agreement as a whole See, ag., Onderdonk v. Presbyterian
Homes, 85 NJ. 171, 182, 187, 425 A.2d 1057, 1062-63, 1065-66 (1981) (implied agree-
ment that defendant would not use money paid by nursing home residents to improve
defendant's other nursing homes and implied incidental obligation to provide plaintiffs
with "meaningful" financial statements); see also Quader-Kino A.G. v. Nebenzal, 35 Cal.
2d 287, 289, 293-94, 217 P.2d 650, 651, 655 (1950). See infra note 239.
For a case that admitted proof of the term under both theories, interpretation and
partial integration, see Paccon, Inc. v. United States, 399 F.2d 162 (Ct. CL 1968). In that
case, proof of an oral promise was deemed admissible to aid in interpreting the contract
and also as an additional term of the agreement because it was "the type the defendant
would naturally make... without including it in the formal written agreement." Id. at
171 n.1.
180. See Masciotra v. Harlow, 105 CaL App. 2d 376, 377, 233 P.2d 586, 588 (1951);
Garden Suburbs Golf & Country Club, Inc. v. Pruitt, 156 Fla. 825, 827, 24 So. 2d 898,
899 (1946); Dickey v. Philadelphia Minit-Man Corp., 377 Pa. 549, 551, 105 A.2d 580,
580 (1954).
181. See Cousins Inv. Co. v. Hastings Clothing Co., 45 Cal. App. 2d 141, 149, 113
P.2d 878, 882 (1941); Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Giddens, 54 Ga. App. 69, 69, 187 S.E. 201,202
(1936); Taylor v. Universal Tire, Inc., 672 S.W.2d 775, 779 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1984); E.
Farnsworth, supra note 25, § 7.16, at 525 n.27 (1982); see also Long Island R.R. v.
Northville Indus., 41 N.Y.2d 455, 461-62, 362 N.E.2d 558, 562, 393 N.Y.S.2d 925, 929-
30 (1977) (licensee's obligation limited to minimum annual payments under license be-
cause no implied promise that it would build oil pipeline that would increase revenue).
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fair market value of the property.1 82 The parol evidence rule does not
bar extrinsic evidence introduced to show that the fixed rental is merely
nominal or at least significantly below the fair market value of the prop-
erty at the time of the agreement."s3
A. Example of Implied Warranty of Fitness for a Particular Purpose
A number of warranties arise by operation of law in a sale of goods
transaction,184 most of which require little or no introduction of extrinsic
evidence.18 The implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose is a
notable exception. It arises when the seller has reason to know of the
buyer's particular purpose and that the buyer is relying on the seller's
skill or judgment."l 6 The written order (or contract) may show the
buyer's particular purpose,"8 7 but frequently it does not.188
Does the parol evidence rule bar evidence of negotiations between par-
ties to prove the facts establishing an implied warranty of fitness?189 At
common law the prevailing view was that it did not because the parol
182. See, eg., Masciotra v. Harlow, 105 Cal. App. 2d 376, 379-80, 233 P.2d 586, 589
(1951) (minimum rent must be "fair and adequate"); Stop & Shop, Inc. v. Ganem, 347
Mass. 697, 702-04, 200 N.E.2d 248, 251-53 (1964) (minimum rent found substantial).
183. See E. Farnsworth, supra note 25, § 7.17, at 531 n.24.
184. Mechem, Implied and Oral Warranties and the Parol Evidence Rule, 12 Minn. L.
Rev. 209, 218 (1928); Moye, supra note 156, at 596; Note, Warranty Disclaimers and
Limitation of Remedy for Breach of Warranty Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 43
B.U.L. Rev. 396, 400 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Warranty Disclaimers]. Aside from the
express warranties of UCC § 2-313, Article 2 of the U.C.C. recognizes five warranties: the
implied warranty of merchantability, UCC § 2-314(1) (1978), the implied warranty of
fitness for a particular purpose, id. § 2-315, implied warranties arising from a course of
dealing or usage of trade, id. § 2-314(3), the warranty of title, id. § 2-312(1), and the
warranty against infringement, id. § 2-312(3). Of these, only the implied warranty of
fitness for a particular purpose and any implied warranties added by course of dealing or
usage of trade require much significant inquiry into matters extrinsic to the writing. For a
recent extensive discussion of UCC Article 2 warranties, see Special Project, Article Two
Warranties in Commercial Transactions, 64 Cornell L. Rev. 30 (1978). On the impor-
tance of clearly distinguishing the implied warranties of merchantability (fitness for ordi-
nary purpose) and fitness for a particular purpose, see Covington & Medved, The Implied
Warranty of Fitness for a Particular Purpose: Some Persistent Problems, 9 Ga. L. Rev.
149, 149-51 (1974).
185. The warranty of title arises from the mere fact of sale. U.C.C. § 2-312(1) (1978).
The implied warranty of merchantability arises when the seller is "a merchant with re-
spect to goods of that kind." Id. § 2-314(1). The warranty against infringement arises
when the seller is "a merchant regularly dealing in goods of the kind." Id. § 2-312(3).
186. Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know any particular
purpose for which the goods are required and that the buyer is relying on the
seller's skill or judgment to select or furnish suitable goods, there is unless ex-
cluded or modified under the next section an implied warranty that the goods
shall be fit for such purpose.
Id. § 2-315.
187. See Roto-Lith, Ltd. v. F.P. Bartlett & Co., 297 F.2d 497, 500 (1st Cir. 1962).
188. See Strahorn, supra note 59, at 733-35.
189. In these cases, the extrinsic evidence is more closely related to the negotiations
than are facts of market value in the percentage lease cases. The credibility of the parties
may be at issue when testifying about what the buyer told the seller about his particular
purpose or how the seller responded. But the parol evidence rule cannot police the credi-
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evidence rule does not apply to obligations arising by operation of law.",
Commentators unamimously agreed.19 1 Does the UCC parol evidence
rule apply to the facts necessary to prove an implied warranty of fitness?
The answer under the Code, as it was at common law, should be no."
But, because two important commentators have recently, without expla-
nation, said it does,' 9 3 this Article will enumerate some of the reasons
bility of all oral evidence wherever a written contract exists. See Sweet, supra note 7, at
1052.
190. See, eg., United States Credit Bureau, Inc, v. Powell, 121 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 870,
871-72, 264 P.2d 229, 230-31 (1953) (reversing trial court's refusal to allow parol evidence
to prove breach of implied warranties); McDonald v. Sanders, 103 FI. 93, 98-100, 137
So. 122, 125 (1931)(extrinsic evidence to prove implied warranties not precluded by parol
evidence rule); John A. Roebling's Sons Co. v. Southern Power Co., 142 Ga. 464, 469, 83
S.E. 138, 140-41 (1914) (same); Nettles v. Imperial Distribs., Inc., 152 W. Va. 9, 15, 159
S.E.2d 206, 210 (1968) (same). For listings of further cases, see Buchanan v. Dugan, 82
A.2d 911, 914 & nn.4-6 (D.C. 1951); Strahorn, supra note 59, at 735 n.28 ; Parol Warran-
ties, supra note 156, at 864 n.47. The implied warranty of fitness for a particular use is a
"warranty which attaches itself to the contract of sale, independent of any express repre-
sentation by the manufacturer of the suitablity of the machinery for such use." Interna-
tional Harvester Co. of Am. v. Bean, 159 Ky. 842, 846, 169 S.W. 549, 550 (1914). But see
Bowser & Co. v. Independent Dye House, Inc., 276 Mass. 289, 295-96, 177 N.E. 268, 270
(1931) (parol evidence rule precludes extrinsic evidence to prove implied warranty of
fitness). For a discussion of whether a merger clause operates as a "waiver" (disclaimer)
of the implied warranty, see infra notes 216-29 and accompanying text.
191. See, ag., 3 A. Corbin, supra note 7, § 585, at 488, § 593, at 563; E. Farnsworth,
supra note 25, § 7.16, at 525 n.27; 4 S. Wiflliston, supra note 9, § 643, at 1084-85;
Mechem, supra note 184, at 218-20; Merger Clause, supra note 91, at 365.
Professor Strahorn gives a broader reach to the parol evidence rule than Williston, who
limits the applicability of the rule to "agreements," see 4 S. Williston, supra note 9, § 643,
at 1084, because Strahorn applies it to "facts dehors a writing," see Strahorn, The Unity
of the Parol Evidence Rule 14 Minn. L. Rev. 20, 20 (1929). In the context of warranties,
Strahom applies the rule to "jurally unfavorable statements" (assuming absence of fraud)
because these are natural to include in the writing. See Strahorn, supra note 59, at 747-
51. This characterization covers a promissory ("prophetic") express warranty ("This car
will do well on rough roads."), and an express warranty by airmation of fact (assertive
express warranty) ('CThis car is built to do well on rough roads."). See id at 729-30. It
does not cover statements and facts giving rise to an implied warranty of fitness for a
particular purpose, (Buyer: "I need a car for rough roads;" Seller: '"Take this model.'
because it is not natural to include these in the writing. See id. at 731, 733-36. Thus,
Strahom would not make the parol evidence rule's operation turn on whether the war-
ranty was promissory or implied in law (as Williston does), but rather on whether it
would be natural to include the operative facts in the writing. See id. at 732. His thesis is
that it is natural to omit operative facts giving rise to implied warranties from the writing.
See id. at 746-47, 750-51. The Second Restatement also takes the position that implied
warranties are naturally omitted from the writing. See Second Restatement, supra note 2,
§ 216(2)(b) comment d & ill. 9. See infra note 193.
192. See supra notes 190-91 and accompanying text.
193. See E. Murphy & R. Speidel, Studies in Contract Law 746-47 (3d ed. 1984); see
also 9 J. Wigmore, supra note 9, § 2434, at 115 n.3 (indicating that evidence giving rise to
implied warranty of fitness can be excluded by parol evidence rule).
Some confusion may be caused by the Second Restatement's use of implied warranties
in § 216 illustration 9 as examples of comment d, "Terms omitted naturally":
A and B sign a written agreement, complete on its face, for the sale of a
specific machine by A to B. The writing describes the machine and warrants
that it is new, but contains no other terms relevant to warranty. Warranties of
title, conformity to the description, merchantability, or fitness for a particular
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why the UCC parol evidence rule does not apply to proof of an implied
warranty of fitness.
The Code's parol evidence rule prohibits contradiction of the final
writing by "any prior agreement" or by "a contemporaneous oral agree-
ment." '194 If the writing is "intended also as a complete and exclusive
statement of the terms of the agreement," the UCC bars evidence of even
"consistent additional terms." 195 Thus, the UCC parol evidence rule ap-
plies only if the extrinsic evidence is introduced to prove an "agreement"
or "term." Therefore, whether extrinsic evidence may be introduced to
prove an implied warranty of fitness depends on whether the implied
warranty is either an "agreement" or "term." Both of these words are
defined in the Code. "Term" is defined as "that portion of an agreement
which relates to a particular matter." '196 Thus the definition of "term"
directs us to the definition of "agreement." "Agreement" is defined as
"the bargain of the parties in fact as found in their language or by impli-
cation from other circumstances." 19 7 At least for purposes of Article 2,
"agreement" includes a present sale. 198 Does it include the warranties
imposed by law on the sale? The Code carefully distinguishes between
the concepts of "agreement" and "contract." "Contract" is defined as
"the total legal obligation which results from the parties' agreement as
affected by this Act and other applicable rules of law." 199 The defini-
tional sections of "contract" and "agreement" make cross-references to
each other with the direction to "compare," thus pointing out to the
reader that although the word "contract" includes obligations imposed
by law, the word "agreement" does not.2o°
Because the implied warranty of fitness doubtlessly arises by operation
of law and not by virtue of the parties' assent,2°' the two commentators
purpose, arising under Uniform Commercial Code §§ 2-312 through 2-315, are
not excluded. Whether an additional oral warranty of quality is superseded
depends on whether the agreement is completely integrated.
Second Restatement, supra note 2, § 216(2)(b) ill. 9. However, a term that "might natu-
rally be omitted" is admissible even if the parties assented to the writing as the complete
and exclusive statement of their agreement. Id. § 216(2)(b) comment a. Therefore, the
Second Restatement view does not contemplate potential exclusion of the implied war-
ranty of fitness by the UCC's parol evidence rule, UCC § 2-202(b).
194. U.C.C. § 2-202 (1978).
195. Id. § 2-202(b).
196. Id. § 1-201(42).
197. Id. § 1-201(3). The word "bargain" is not defined in the Code. Mellinkoff, The
Language of the Uniform Commercial Code, 77 Yale L.J. 185, 189 (1967). The Second
Restatement defines "bargain" as "an agreement to exchange promises or to exchange a
promise for a performance or to exchange performances." See Second Restatement,
supra note 2, § 3.
198. See U.C.C. § 2-106(1) (1978).
199. Id. § 1-201(11). Section 2-106(1) defines "contract for sale" as both a present sale
of goods and a contract to sell goods in the future. Id. § 2-106(1).
200. See id. §§ 1-201(3), (11). The Code, however, is not always consistent in main.
taining this distinction. See Mellinkoff, supra note 197, at 189.
201. See John A. Roebling's Sons Co. v. Southern Power Co., 142 Ga. 464, 469, 83
S.E. 138, 140 (1914) (implied warranty of fitness "is an implication which the law itself
[Vol. 54
PAR OL EVIDENCE AND IMPLIED TERMS
who characterized it as a "term of the agreement"'  seem to have lost
sight of this important limit on the concept of "agreement." The facts
necessary to prove the implied warranty of fitness are not subject to the
parol evidence rule because they are not introduced to prove a "term of
the agreement" but to prove an obligation imposed by law. 03
The warranty provisions of the Code add further support to this analy-
sis. Section 2-315 states that an implied warranty of fitness for a particu-
lar purpose exists by virtue of the circumstances of the sale unless
excluded or modified under section 2-316.10 Thus, the only exclusion-
ary mechanism mentioned for the implied warranty is section 2-316.
Section 2-316, in turn, distinguishes between express and implied warran-
ties.5 The subsection dealing with express warranties" makes a cross-
reference to the UCC parol evidence rule, section 2-202, yet none of the
subsections relating to disclaimer of implied warranties contain that
cross-reference.' 7 This suggests that, although express warranties are
subject to the parol evidence rule, the implied warranty of fitness is
not." 8 In addition, although the official comments to the warranty pro-
imposes"); International Harvester Co. of Am. v. Bean, 159 Ky. 842, 846, 169 S.W. 549,
550 (1914) (implied waranty of fitness "attaches" to contract of sale); see also Farns-
worth, supra note 6, at 862-68 (tracing development of implied terms from early cases
that based such implications on intention of the parties to later judicial recognition that
such terms are duties imposed by law).
202. See E. Murphy & R. Speidel, supra note 193, at 746-47 (implied warranties are
"'terms of the agreement.'.. . [The] implied warranty [of merchantability] emerges
from the very roots of the bargain. .... ).
203. See 1 New York State Law Revision Commission, Study of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code 412 n.104 (1955) [hereinafter cited as New York State Law Revision Com-
mission]; J. White and R. Summers, supra note 177, § 2-12, at 90. Consistent with the
analysis that an implied warranty of fitness is part of the "contract" but not a "term" of
the "agreement!' as those terms are defined in the Code, see supra notes 196-200 and
accompanying text, under UCC § 2-314, a warranty of merchantability is "implied in a
contract [not agreement] for. . . sale," see U.C.C. § 2-314 (1978), and under UCC § 2-
312, a warranty of title against infringement "is in a contract [not agreement] for sale,"
id. § 2-312.
204. See U.C.C. § 2-315 official comment 1 (1978). Whether the implied warranty of
fitness exists in any particular case is a question of fact under the circumstances. This is
not the same as saying that the implied warranty of fitness is part of the parties' bargain
in fact. But see E. Murphy & R. Speidel, supra note 193, at 746-47 ("[An] implied war-
ranty of merchantablility emerges from the very roots of the bargain.").
205. See U.C.C. § 2-316 (1978).
206. See id. § 2-316(1).
207. See id. § 2-316(2), (3).
208. U.C.C. § 2-316(1)'s cross-reference to U.C.C. § 2-202 is important because the
section states a rule for express warranties which is in conflict with § 2-202, and if no
cross-reference were made, § 2-316(1) could have been construed as eliminating the parol
evidence rule in the context of express warranties. It could be argued, however, that even
if the parol evidence rule of § 2-202 were intended to apply to implied warranties, it
would have been unnecessary to make a cross-reference to § 2-202 in § 2-316(2) because
§ 2-316(2) states an additional rule of exclusion which does not conflict with the parol
evidence rule of exclusion in § 2-202. It is important to remember, however, that § 2-
315, the Code section establishing the implied warranty of fitness, provides only one




visions refer to the parol evidence rule, no such references are made with
respect to proof of circumstances necessary to establish an implied war-
ranty.2 °9 Although the Code's warranty sections and official comments
do not expressly preclude applying the parol evidence rule to the facts
necessary to give rise to the implied warranty of fitness for a particular
purpose, they imply that the rule does not apply.
The case law under the Code agrees.210 Cases under the Code consider
the parol evidence rule in connection with allegations of express warran-
ties2 1 but do not apply the parol evidence rule to implied warranties
such as those of merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose.2 2
Textual analysis of the UCC parol evidence rule, negative inferences
from the warranty provisions and the comments thereto, and the case
law construing the Code support the suggested analysis. Nevertheless, it
might be argued that the UCC parol evidence rule would apply to the
implied warranty of fitness if the Code were intended to expand the cov-
erage of the parol evidence rule. The opposite is true.213 Although a few
cases state that the UCC parol evidence rule does not change the com-
mon law rule,21 4 most cases and commentators view the Code's formula-
209. See generally U.C.C. § 2-312 to -316 official comments (1978).
210. See, ag., Appeals of Reeves Soundcraft Corp., 2 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan)
210, 219 (ASBCA 1964); Moye, supra note 156, at 606; Warranty Disclaimers, supra note
184, at 400. The same conclusion was reached under the Uniform Sales Act. See, e.g.,
Buchanan v. Dugan, 82 A.2d 911, 913 (D.C. 1951); Bekkevold v. Potts, 173 Minn. 87, 90,
216 N.W. 790, 791 (1927).
211. See, eg., Computerized Radiological Servs. v. Syntex Corp., 595 F. Supp. 1495,
1505-07 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (express warranty admitted as consistent additional term where
written contract was a partial integration); Jordan v. Doonan Truck & Equip., Inc., 220
Kan. 431, 435, 552 P.2d 881, 884 (1976) (parol evidence rule bars evidence of alleged
express warranties where written contract stated as is, where is, no warranty).
212. Appeals of Reeves Soundcraft Corp., 2 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 210, 219
(ASBCA 1964); Moye, supra note 156, at 606; Warranty Disclaimers, supra note 184, at
400; see also Computerized Radiological Servs. v. Syntex Corp., 595 F. Supp. 1495, 1508-
09 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (only disclaimer provisions, not parol evidence rule, considered on
issue of existence of implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose).
In Thorman v. Polytemp, Inc., 2 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 772 (N.Y. County Ct.
1965), the written sales agreement included both a merger clause and a valid disclaimer.
See id. at 774. The court held that extrinsic evidence to prove an implied warranty of
fitness was barred by the Code's parol evidence rule, § 2-202. See id. Because the implied
warranty is not a "term" of the "agreement," § 2-202 is inapplicable to it. See supra
notes 194-200 and accompanying text. The court seems to have applied the broad eviden-
tiary common law parol evidence rule that any extrinsic evidence is inadmissible to con-
tradict a provision of a written contract, in this case, the disclaimer provision. See 4 S.
Williston, supra note 9, § 631, at 948-49. It has been forcefully argued in the context of
trade usage and course of dealing that applying the broad evidentiary common law parol
evidence rule in a UCC case to exclude any extrinsic evidence which apparently contra-
dicts a final writing causes confusion and even a subversion of UCC theory. See Kirst,
supra note 148, at 832-36.
213. Compare 5 S. Williston, supra note 9, § 654, at 60 (parol evidence rule principles
applicable to trade usage used to supplement written contract) with Kirst, supra note 148,
at 35 ("[E]vidence of usage of trade. . . is not excludable parol evidence under section 2-
202. .. .")
214. See, eg., Green Chevrolet Co. v. Kemp, 241 Ark. 62, 64, 406 S.W.2d 142, 143
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tion of the rule as less restrictive than the common law rule."' Certainly
there is no authority for the proposition that the Code rule is intended to
exclude more evidence than was excluded under the prior law.
B. Effect of Merger Clause
Does a merger clause exclude an implied warranty or extrinsic evi-
dence necessary to establish implied warranties? At common law, the
cases were in conflict, but the majority view was that it did not.2" 6 The
reason for the apparently conflicting decisions was that resolution of the
issue depended on the interpretation of the merger clause.2" 7 If the
merger clause was interpreted as a mere paraphrase of the assumption
made by the traditional parol evidence rule, it did not exclude implied
warranties.21 If the merger clause was interpreted as an expression of
intent to exclude any unwritten obligation (including one imposed by
(1966) (Arkansas parol evidence rule not changed by UCC § 2-202); Glenn Dick Equip.
Co. v. Galey Constr., Inc., 97 Idaho 216, 223, 541 P.2d 1184, 1191 (1975) (UCC § 2-202
incorporates common law parol evidence rule); Jordan v. Doonan Truck & Equip., Inc.,
220 Kan. 431,435,552 P.2d 881, 884 (1976) ("From the Comments accompanying [UCC
§] 2-202 and case law concerning that section, it is clear the Code is not meant to change
the local parol evidence rule.").
215. See, e.g., S.M. Wilson & Co. v. Smith Int'l, Inc., 587 F.2d 1363, 1370 (9th Cir.
1978); Michael Schiavone & Sons, Inc. v. Securalloy Co., 312 F. Supp. 801, 804 (D.
Conn. 1970); Zwierzycki v. Owens, 499 P.2d 996, 997 (Wyo. 1972); 1 New York State
Law Revision Commission, supra note 203, at 598; Broude, supra note 14, at 906-07, 911-
12, 918; Weintraub, Disclaimers of Warranties and Limitations of Damages for Breach of
Warranty under the UCC, 53 Tex. L. Rev. 60, 74-75 (1974).
216. See, e.g., United States Gypsum Co. v. Schiavo Bros., 668 F.2d 172, 175 (3d Cir.
1981) (implied covenant in lease to return premises in same condition as received not
negated by merger clause), cert denied, 456 U.S. 961 (1982); Sperry Rand Corp. v. Indus-
trial Supply Corp., 337 F.2d 363, 371 (5th Cir. 1964) (merger clause does not bar recov-
ery on implied warranty of fitness for use); Bekkevold v. Potts, 173 Minn. 87, 89-90, 216
N.W. 790, 791 (1927) (merger clause may be so worded so that implied warranties are
not excluded); 3 A. Corbin, supra note 7, § 578, at 411-12 (merger clause does not neces-
sarily preclude existence of implied warranties); 4 S. Williston, supra note 9, § 643, at
1079 & n.6 (same); Merger Clause, supra note 91, at 365-66 (only merger clauses which
expressly exclude implied warranties should have that effect); Moye, supra note 156, at
606 (merger clause does not necessarily preclude existence of implied warranties); see also
Buchanan v. Dugan, 82 A.2d 911, 913-14 (D.C. 1951) (merger clause did not bar evi-
dence of implied warranty on hearing aid); Hughes v. National Equip. Corp., 216 Iowa
1000, 1004-05, 250 N.W. 154, 156-57 (1933) (evidence of implied warranty on machines
sold not barred by merger clause); Ideal Heating Co. v. Kramer, 127 Iowa 137, 143, 102
N.W. 840, 842 (1905) (merger clause "does not exclude an implied warranty where one
would otherwise be found"). But see Detroit Trust Co. v. Engel, 192 Mich. 62, 64, 158
N.W. 123, 124 (1916) (merger clause in contract excluded implied warranty); F.A. North
Co. v. Beebe, 11 NJ. Mfisc. 759, 760, 168 A. 632, 633 (1933) (same); Rockwood & Co. v.
Parrot & Co., 142 Or. 261, 269-72, 19 P.2d 423, 426-27 (1933) (same); 4 S. Williston,
supra note 9, § 643, at 1078-79 (some cases hold that merger clause excludes implied
warranties); Parol Warranties, supra note 156, at 867 (statement in a final writing that
the writing contains the entire agreement is an express disclaimer of implied warranties).
217. See 3 A. Corbin, supra note 7, § 578, at 412 ("Here, as elsewhere, the process of
interpretation leads to results that seem to be inconsistent and conflicting so far as can be
determined from the court opinions.").
218. See Sperry Rand Corp. v. Industrial Supply Corp., 337 F.2d 363, 371 (5th Cir.
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law), the merger clause was a disclaimer.2 19 The outcome of the cases
often depended on the language of the particular merger clause.22° On
the whole, there was a tendency to interpret them narrowly against ex-
clusion,221 but particularly when the writing contained an express war-
ranty in addition to the merger clause, the merger clause was sometimes
given the effect of a disclaimer.12
In sum, the common law cases concerning merger clauses grappled
with the question of whether the merger clause acted as a disclaimer of
the implied warranties, not with whether a merger clause excludes refer-
ence to the parties' negotiations establishing an implied warranty.
Because the Code parol evidence rule is inapplicable to obligations im-
posed by law,223 proof of the implied warranty of fitness is admissibleeven though the merger clause signifies that the parties intended their
1964); Ideal Heating Co. v. Kramer, 127 Iowa 137, 143, 102 N.W. 840, 842 (1905); 5 S.
Williston, supra note 9, § 811, at 887.
In Sperry Rand, the seller had made prior written representations of fitness for use
which were excluded by an integration clause. See Sperry Rand, 337 F.2d at 365-66, 370.
Even though an express warranty of fitness for use was barred by the parol evidence rule,
the court admitted the written representations to prove an implied warranty of fitness for
use. See id. at 371. The court stated: "[W]here the alleged verbal warranty sought to be
established is only what would be implied, evidence thereof does not change the legal
effect of the contract, and is therefore admissible." Id. (quoting McDonald v. Sanders,
103 Fla. 93, 99, 137 So. 122, 125 (1931)).
Where, however, a term has been discussed in early negotiations and then dropped or
where a party refused to include a promise in the written contract, the courts have some-
times concluded that the term was intentionally excluded and refused to imply the same
term. See supra notes 164-65, infra note 239 and accompanying text.
219. See Bagley v. General Fire Extinguisher Co., 150 F. 284, 286-87 (2d Cir. 1906),
appeal dismissed, 212 U.S. 477 (1909); Parol Warranties, supra note 156, at 867.
220. Compare Bekkevold v. Potts, 173 Minn. 87, 90, 216 N.W. 790, 791 (1927)(Merger clause stated: "No warranties have been made. . . by the seller to the buyer
unless written hereon." None were written. The court held that because only express
warranties are "made" by seller, the parties did not intend to exclude implied warranties.)
with Bagley v. General Fire Extinguisher Co., 150 F. 284, 285, 287 (2d Cir. 1906)(Merger clause stated: "It is explicitly understood and agreed that no obligations other
than herein set forth ... shall be binding upon either party." The court held this lan-
guage to mean that "no warranties should be attached to the contract except those that
were 'set forth' in terms."), appeal dismissed, 212 U.S. 477 (1909).
221. See Parol Warranties, supra note 156, at 867-68, 870; see also United States Credit
Bureau v. Powell, 121 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 870, 871-72, 264 P.2d 229, 230-31 (1953)
("Obviously, the statement in the written contract that it contains the entire agreement of
the parties cannot furnish ... an avenue of escape from the entirely reasonable obliga-
tion implied in all contracts to the effect that the work performed 'shall be fit and proper
for its said intended use.' ") (quoting Kuitems v. Covell, 104 Cal. App. 2d 482, 485, 231
P.2d 552, 554 (1951)); J.B. Colt Co. v. Bridges, 162 Ga. 154, 158, 132 S.E. 889, 891(1926) ("The assertion of the implied warranty of [fitness for particular purpose] does not
in any way conflict with the stipulations of the written contract of sale that the instru-
ment contains all the agreements of the parties."); Bekkevold v. Potts, 173 Minn. 87, 90,
216 N.W. 790, 791 (1927) ("We must conclude that the parties did not intend to exclude
the implied warranty which could easily have been done in unmistakable terms had they
so chosen.").
222. See supra note 219 and accompanying text.
223. See supra notes 192-215 and accompanying text.
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writing to be a "complete and exclusive statement .. of the agree-
ment." 4 If the merger clause is to affect implied warranties under the
Code it is strictly as a disclaimer that meets the requirements of UCC
section 2-316(2). Although a warranty of fitness for a particular purpose
can be disclaimed under that section with general language,22 a simple
statement that the writing contains the entire agreement of the parties
should not qualify because it does not manifest an intention to exclude
implied warranties. 6 An additional protection under that section, the
requirement of conspicuousness,2 7 will prevent even a merger clause
that explicitly refers to implied warranties from acting as a "secret dis-
claimer."2 8  If a simple merger clause could exclude an implied war-
ranty of fitness for a particular purpose, the Code's policy of protecting
buyers by a conspicuous disclaimer would be subverted. That policy re-
quires both conspicuousness and language of disclaimer, not of
merger.2 9
In conclusion, the parol evidence rule does not exclude extrinsic evi-
dence to establish an obligation imposed by law. The issue has been
raised frequently in connection with the implied warranty of fitness for a
particular purpose. ° Despite the assertions of some recent commen-
tary, this warranty should not be considered a "term" of the "agree-
ment" under the Code. Thus, neither the parol evidence rule nor a
simple merger clause excludes implied warranties or the extrinsic evi-
dence necessary to establish them.
224. U.C.C. § 2-202(b) (1978); see Duckworth v. Ford Motor Co., 211 F. Supp. 888,
891 (E.D. Pa. 1962), rev'd in part on other grounds, 320 F.2d 130 (3d Cir. 1963); J. White
& R. Summers, supra note 177, § 2-12, at 90; see also Buchanan v. Dugan, 82 A.2d 911,
913-14 (D.C. 1951) (reaching this conclusion under the Uniform Sales Act). But see
Moye, supra note 156, at 607 ("The fact that the buyer has signed an agreement which
states that it represents the entire contract between the parties tends to show that he is
willing to waive all of the prior negotiations" including the circumstances necessary to
establish the implied warranty.).
The Second Restatement states that "if agreed to [a merger clause] is likely to conclude
the issue whether the agreement is completely integrated. Consistent additional terms
may then be excluded even though their omission would have been natural in the absence
of such a clause." Second Restatement, supra note 2, § 216 comment e. This statement is
made just after illustration 9 to § 216 in which a number of implied warranties are char-
acterized as "[tierms omitted naturally." Id. ilL 9. The Second Restatement's suggestion
that implied warranties might be natural to include in the writing in view of a merger
clause is untenable and, presumably, unintentional.
225. See U.C.C. § 2-316(2) (1978). In the 1952 draft of the Code, an implied warranty
of fitness for a particular purpose could be disclaimed only by specific language. Ezer,
The Impact of the Uniform Commercial Code on the California Law of Sales Warranties,
8 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 281, 316 (1961).
226. See supra note 216 and accompanying text.
227. See U.C.C. § 2-316(2) (1978).
228. See Hogan, The Highways and Some of the Byways in the Sales and Bulk Sales
Articles of the Uniform Commercial Code, 48 Cornell L.Q. 1, 7, 9 (1962).
229. See U.C.C. § 2-316(2) (1978). But see E. Murphy & R. Speidel, supra note 193, at
747 (suggesting that conspicuous "manifestation of intention to integrate the writing"
would exclude implied warranties).
230. See supra note 210 and accompanying text
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IV. MAY PAROL EVIDENCE BE INTRODUCED TO HELP DEFINE THE
MEANING OF AN IMPLIED TERM?
It is frequently held that, even if the parol evidence rule excludes ex-
trinsic evidence of the parties' agreement submitted to prove the agree-
ment,231 the same evidence is admissible to help define the meaning of
the term the law implies to fill the gaps in the parties' written agree-
ment.232 Thus, courts have frequently admitted evidence of the parties'
actual agreement to help define the meaning of "reasonable time, ' 233 and
occasionally of "best efforts". 234 One commentator has pointed to these
decisions as anomalous.235 The author respectfully disagrees. Although
parol evidence is considered by the jury, the jury uses it to determine the
scope of an already established legal obligation as applied to the particu-
lar facts of the case. It is one thing to admit evidence of the conversa-
tions of the parties to prove that the repairer had a duty to complete
repairs within three months, and another to admit the same evidence to
determine what amounts to a reasonable time under the circum-
stances.23 6
231. This could occur if the agreement is fully integrated or if the court deems the
implied term to be part of the integration. See supra notes 26-39 and accompanying text.
232. See, e.g., American Historical Soe'y v. Vestal, 189 Ark. 651, 652-53, 74 S.W.2d
964, 965 (1934); Epstein v. Paganne, Ltd., 44 A.D.2d 520, 520, 353 N.Y.S.2d 190, 192
(1974) (per curiam); see also 3 A. Corbin, supra note 7, § 593, at 557-59; Second Restate-
ment, supra note 2, § 204 comment e, § 213 ill. 3; 4 S. Williston, supra note 9, § 640, at
1051-53.
233. See American Historical Soc'y v. Vestal, 189 Ark. 651, 652, 74 S.W.2d 964, 965
(1934); Gluckman v. Holzman, 29 Del. Ch. 458, 466, 51 A.2d 487, 491 (1947); Weiner v.
Rex Pontiac Corp., 8 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 191, 191 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1970).
234. See Epstein v. Paganne, Ltd., 44 A.D.2d 520, 520, 353 N.Y.S.2d 190, 191 (1974)
(per curiam) (trial court should have heard evidence of parties' understanding to deter-
mine meaning of "best efforts"); see also Paccon, Inc. v. United States, 399 F.2d 162, 170-
71 & n.l 1 (Ct. Cl. 1968) (consideration of pre-contract discussions does not violate the
parol evidence rule because they do not contradict anything in the contract but merely
"spell out and trigger.., the latent obligation ... of the Government to take reasonable
steps to coordinate the work"). Cf. Kubik v. J. & R. Foods, Inc., 282 Or. 179, 183-84,
186 n.5, 577 P.2d 518, 520, 521 n.5 (1978) (suggesting parol evidence would have been
admissible on issue of whether the good faith was that of a buyer in an exclusive dealing
contract, UCC § 2-306(2) (implied good faith obligation to promote the product), or that
of requirements buyer, UCC § 2-306(1) (good faith in determining requirements)). But
see Local 461 of the Int'l Union of Elec., Radio and Mach. Workers v. Singer Co., 540 F.
Supp. 442, 446-47 (D.N.J. 1982) (parol evidence inadmissible to show that one party was
obligated to continue in business where the contract was unambiguous and fully inte-
grated); United States v. Wallace & Wallace Fuel Oil Co., 540 F. Supp. 419, 427(S.D.N.Y. 1982) (express best efforts clause not "inherently ambiguous").
235. See Sweet, supra note 7, at 1039.
236. See Second Restatement, supra note 2, § 204 comment e ("Where there is com-
plete integration and interpretation of the writing discloses a failure to agree on an essen-
tial term, evidence of prior negotatiations or agreements . . .may be admissible, if
relevant, on the question of what is reasonable in the circumstances.").
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V. MAY PAROL EVIDENCE BE INTRODUCED TO NEGATE A TERM
IMPLIED BY LA-W THOUGH No SUBSTITUTE TERM Is
SOUGHT TO BE PROVED?
It is clear that when a party seeks to add a term to an integrated agree-
ment, evidence of the offered term may be excluded if the agreement is
fully integrated.3 7 But suppose the party seeks to prove an agreement
that merely negates a term the law would imply without seeking to prove
a substituted term. The issue does not generally arise in time of perform-
ance or duration cases. In the former, a time for performance cannot be
negated completely. Because the obligation to perform is expressed, the
performance must occur within some time limit. In the latter, when du-
ration of performance is at issue, an agreement negating duration need
not ordinarily be proved because the usual implication is that the dura-
tion of the performance is terminable at will." s In other words, no dura-
tion is implied.
The issue has sometimes arisen, however, in the case of an implied
obligation of best efforts. In this context the courts have been willing to
look at evidence of the negotiations that show such an obligation was
excluded." 9 Even though such obligations are often termed "implied by
fact," they are not treated as part of the writing for parol evidence
purposes.240
The issue also arises in the case of disclaimer of warranties.24 Sup-
pose a seller makes an oral disclaimer or a prior written disclaimer that is
not included in the final writing. An express warranty found in the writ-
ing itself would no doubt exclude proof of the disclaimer as contradic-
tory. Would an implied warranty be "read into" the writing to exclude
237. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
238. See Boatright v. Steinite Radio Corp., 46 F.2d 385, 389 (10th Cir. 1931); Elliot v.
Delta Air Lines, 116 Ga. App. 36, 36, 156 S.E.2d 656, 656 (1967); Parker v. Borock, 5
N.Y.2d 156, 159, 182 N.Y.S.2d 577, 579 (1959).
239. See, eag., Vacuum Concrete Corp. v. American Mach. & Foundry Co., 321 F.
Supp. 771, 774-75 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (best efforts assured during negotiations but omitted
from written contract); Eastern Elec., Inc. v. Seeburg Corp., 310 F. Supp. 1126, 1145-51
(S.D.N.Y. 1969), afid, 427 F.2d 23 (2d Cir. 1970) (court considered in detail prior pro-
posals and drafts of the agreement; particularly telling was an early proposal which in-
cluded an express "best efforts" clause which was later dropped and replaced by other
provisions); see also Quader-Kino A.G. v. Nebenzal, 35 Cal. 2d 287, 288, 294-95, 217
P.2d 650, 651, 655 (1950) Cmterpretation of two written contracts "with the aid of parol
evidence", revealed that plaintiff's right to exhibit motion picture had expired and there-
fore defendant was under no implied obligation "not to interfere with plaintiff's acquisi-
tion of an extension of [those] rights [nor] to use [defendant's] own independently
acquired... license to prevent plaintiff from exploiting [motion picture]"); Garden Park
Homes Corp. v. Martin Marietta Corp., 507 S.W.2d 368 (Mo. 1974) (per curiam) (oral
agreement for fixed minimum royalty supplementing mineral lease introduced though it
negated implied covenant to use reasonable diligence to extract sand).
240. If they were, the oral agreements would be excluded as contradictory because
implications of fact are generally considered part of the integration. See supra note 112-
13, 131-32 and accompanying text.
241. See infra note 242.
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proof of the disclaimer as contradictory? Cases decided under the tradi-
tional "four comers" view took this approach.242 One commentator has
proposed asking whether the particular purpose of the buyer is stated in
the writing. 3 He argues that if it is, the seller would naturally include
the disclaimer in the writing in order to protect himself. His failure to do
so causes proof of the oral disclaimer to be excluded by the parol evi-
dence rule. Under this approach the result would presumably change if
extrinsic evidence had to be considered to determine that the seller had
reason to know of the buyer's particular purpose. Corbin argues that
because the implied warranty is imposed by law, proof of an agreement
disclaiming it is admissible in every case. 2"
Under the UCC, admissibility of the disclaimer as a term of the agree-
ment presumably depends on whether there is a total or partial integra-
tion. An official comment indicates that UCC section 2-202 may bar
proof of an oral disclaimer.24 The negative implication, therefore, is
that unless the parties intend a total integration, proof of the oral dis-
claimer may be admitted as a consistent additional term. It might be
argued, of course, that proof of the disclaimer is inadmissible because the
parties would certainly have included the disclaimer in the writing.246
One case that considered the admissibility of evidence of a parol dis-
claimer held such evidence inadmissible when the written agreement con-
tained a merger clause.247 Another avoided the question by holding that
proof of the disclaimer was admissible as a course of performance.248
Because course of performance is subsequent to the integration it can
never be excluded by the parol evidence rule.24 9
Suppose evidence of the oral disclaimer is admitted to prove a consis-
tent additional term but the oral disclaimer is ineffective because it is not
made by a conspicuous writing as required by UCC section 2-316(2).250
242. See, eg., Calpetro Producers Syndicate v. Charles M. Woods Co., 206 Cal. 246,
252-53, 274 P. 65, 67-68 (1929) (warranty of title read in to exclude evidence of oral
disclaimer as contradictory); La France v. Kashishian, 204 Cal. 643, 645, 269 P. 655, 656(1928) (implied warranty of title of lessor of real property read in to exclude evidence that
lessee knew of defect in title and that the defect was taken into account in setting the
terms of the lease).
243. See Strahom, supra note 59, at 729 & n.15.
244. 3 A. Corbin, supra note 7, § 585, at 488, § 593, at 559.
245. See U.C.C. § 2-316 official comment 5 (1978).
246. See supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text.
247. See Woodward v. Naylof Motor Sales, 14 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1269,
1273 (Mich. Dist. Ct. 1974).
248. See Robinson v. Branch Moving & Storage Co., 28 N.C. App. 244, 250, 221
S.E.2d 81, 85 (1976). The evidence introduced was not properly characterized as course
of performance, see U.C.C. § 2-208(1) (1978), because it apparently consisted of state-
ments made prior to or contemporaneously with the written sales contract. See Robin-
son, 28 N.C. App. at 249, 221 S.E.2d at 84.
249. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. The course of performance would be
admissible as a modification. See Atlas Concrete Pipe, Inc. v. Roger J. Au & Son, Inc.,
467 F. Supp. 830, 836 (E.D. Mich. 1979), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. In re Atlas
Concrete Pipe, Inc., 668 F.2d 905 (6th Cir. 1982); U.C.C. § 2-208(3) (1978).
250. A disclaimer of the implied warranty of fitness under UCC § 2-316(2) must be
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An official comment indicates that "whether or not language of dis-
claimer satisfies [UCC section 2-316(2)] such language may be relevant
... to the question of whether the warranty was ever in fact created."' 1
Suppose instead, that the parol evidence rule does bar proof of the oral
disclaimer to supplement the written terms of the sales contract. May
proof of the disclaimer be introduced on the issue of whether the implied
warranty arose? The Code is unclear. An official comment states that it
is admissible for that purpose unless prevented by "the provisions of this
Article on parol and extrinsic evidence."' 2  The answer should be yes,
for if it were not, the buyer would have it both ways. As has already
been seen, the parol evidence rule does not prevent the buyer from intro-
ducing extrinsic evidence to prove the operative facts that give rise to the
implied warranty." 3 It would be anomalous, as well as unfair, if the
buyer could introduce evidence of conversations to prove the warranty
but the seller could not introduce evidence of an oral disclaimer to dis-
prove the warranty. Although inadmissible as proof of a term of the
agreement, evidence of the oral disclaimer would be relevant to show the
seller had no reason to know of the buyer's reliance or that the buyer did
not actually rely on the seller.'
Therefore, even if under the parol evidence rule the disclaimer is inop-
erative as a term, and even if it is invalid as a disclaimer due to failure to
comply with the requisite formalities under the Code, evidence of it
should nevertheless be admissible to show that the circumstances of the
sale do not justify imposing an implied warranty.
CONCLUSION
This Article sheds some light on an area of the parol evidence rule
seldom addressed by commentators-the relation between the parol evi-
dence rule and implication of terms. If one conclusion can be reached, it
is that the terms on which the writing is silent, but which are implied by
law or implied in fact, should not be treated as though they were written,
thereby excluding, under the parol evidence rule, proof of the actual
agreement of the parties.
Finally, the parol evidence rule does not exclude reference to the nego-
tiations of the parties for all purposes. It is irrelevant to the issue of
whether the court should consider evidence, including negotiations, in
made by a conspicuous writing. See U.C.C. § 2-316(2) (1978). A disclaimer under UCC
§ 2-316(3) such as "as is" or "with all faults" does not require a writing. See Id. § 2-
316(3).
251. See U.C.C. § 2-316 official comment 5 (1978). ("[O]ral language of disclaimer
may raise issues of fact as to whether reliance by the buyer occurred and whether the
seller had 'reason to know' under the section on implied warranty of fitness for a particu-
lar purpose.")
252. U.C.C. § 2-316 official comment 5 (1978).
253. See supra notes 189-215 and accompanying text.
254. See supra note 251.
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determining whether to imply a term or otherwise impose a legal obliga-
tion on the parties' agreement.
